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Regular version of the site
Of all publications in the section: 12
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Article
Bucciol A., Cavalli L., Pertile P. et al. European Journal of Political Economy. 2017.

The paper presents a large scale overlapping generation model with heterogeneous agents, where the household is the decision unit. We calibrate the model for three European countries – France, Italy and Sweden – which show marked differences in the design of some public programmes. We examine the properties in terms of annual and life cycle redistribution of a number of tax-benefit programmes, by studying the impact of removing from our model economies some or all of them. We find that whether one considers a life cycle or an annual horizon, and whether behavioural responses are accounted for or not, has a large impact on the results. The model may provide useful insights for policy makers on which kind of reforms are more likely to achieve specific equity objectives.

Added: Oct 17, 2016
Article
Tkachenko A., Esaulov D. European Journal of Political Economy. 2020. Vol. 61. P. 1-18.

The personal role of sub-national rulers is crucial for regional development in countries with weak institutions. This paper studies the impact of regional governors’ tenure in office and their local ties on procurement performance in Russia. To identify the causal effect, we construct instruments for governor’s tenure by exploiting the regional vote share of ruling party in past parliament elections. We find the evidence that governors who do not have pre-governing local ties in the region (outsiders) demonstrate predatory behaviour, compared to governors with local ties (insiders). Namely, governors-outsiders restrict the competition at awarding stage significantly more than governors-insiders. Moreover, for governors-outsiders this restriction becomes stronger with tenure in office, while governors-insiders do not demonstrate such negative tenure effect. We argue that this restriction of competition by governors-outsiders cannot be explained by the intention of better contracts execution: the delays in execution and the probability of contract termination either increase or keep stable with tenure for governors-outsiders and these outcomes decrease with tenure for governors-insiders.

Added: Jan 23, 2020
Article
Satarov G. A., Levin M. I. European Journal of Political Economy. 2000. No. 16. P. 113-132.
Added: Nov 2, 2010
Article
Marques II I., Remington T. F., Bazavliuk V. European Journal of Political Economy. 2020. Vol. 63. P. 101888.

How and when are governments able to encourage firms and schools to work together to develop workers’ skills? Upgrading the quality of human capital in the workforce is widely seen as a key challenge faced by countries looking to escape the “middle income trap.” Growing attention has been paid to public-private partnerships (PPP) between individual firms and schools as a powerful tool for meeting this challenge, but key facilitators of PPP thought crucial in existing studies – strong, independent employers’ associations and labor unions – are often missing in such settings. To explore the emergence of PPP in skill development in the developing world, we draw on recent reform experiences in Russia’s regions that have led to a surge in complex, costly forms of PPP despite weakly developed business associations and unions. We argue that variation in the administrative capacity of regional governments and their political accountability explains this surge. Strong administrative capacity reassures all parties that regional authorities can monitor their counterparties’ compliance with agreements, while political accountability creates incentives for authorities to do so. We test our argument using original data on the existence and content of firm-school partnerships across all Russia’s regions for 2013.

Added: May 29, 2020
Article
Frye T. M., Ивасаки И. European Journal of Political Economy. 2011. Vol. 27. No. 4. P. 642-658.
Added: Feb 20, 2012
Article
Azarnert L. V. European Journal of Political Economy. 2010. Vol. 26. No. 4. P. 431-440.

I show how the influences of unskilled immigration, differential fertility between immigrants and the local indigenous population, and incentives for investment in human capital combine to predict the decline of the West. In particular, indigenous low-skilled workers lose from unskilled immigration even if the indigenous low-skilled workers do not finance redistribution, do not compete with immigrants in the labor market, and do not compete with immigrants for publicly financed income transfers. For the economy at large, high-fertility unskilled immigrants and a low-fertility indigenous population result in economic decline through reduced human capital accumulation and reduced growth of per-capita output.

Added: Oct 3, 2018
Article
Azarnert L. V. European Journal of Political Economy. 2018. Vol. 54. P. 89-98.

This paper studies the effect of refugee resettlement on human capital accumulation. The analysis is performed in a growth model with endogenous fertility. I show how refugee resettlement from a more advanced and wealthier economy to a less advanced and less wealthy economy combined with income transfers is Pareto-improving for indigenous populations in both countries. I also derive conditions for the proposed resettlement policy to stimulate human capital accumulation and hence economic growth in both economies.

Added: Nov 20, 2018
Article
Borisova E., Govorun A., Ivanov D. et al. European Journal of Political Economy. 2018. Vol. 54. P. 56-67.

We empirically study how social capital influences individuals' preferences for redistribution to target groups using unique surveys of approximately 34,000 individuals across 68 Russian regions in 2007 and 2011. There is a positive relationship between social capital and support for government redistribution based on objective verifiable criteria. We interpret the results in terms of the perceived likelihood of cheating. Benefits to the ‘needy’ are at greater risk of being diverted to nondeserving claimants compared to benefits for which there are objective criteria, such as merit, being retired or disabled, or having many children. Our results show that when there is higher social capital in a region, there is also less tolerance for the possibility of cheating by recipients of government income transfers.

Added: Jun 18, 2018
Article
Dagaev D., Lamberova N., Sobolev A. European Journal of Political Economy. 2019. Vol. 60. P. 101812.

Why do some newly introduced revolutionary governments face anti-government demonstrations and swiftly exit office, while others are able to establish political regimes that last for decades? Historical evidence finds revolutionary governments in the first decade of twenty-first century to be three times more vulnerable to mass protest than a hundred years ago. What can explain this trend? This paper relates the stability of newly emerged revolutionary governments to the political composition of the protest that brings a new incumbent to power and in factors that can shape it. Our theoretical model, incorporating protest into a dynamic Downsian framework, features the significant role of protest coordination, communication technology, ideology, and the coercive capacity of the regime. This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it discusses a new historical trend of instability of revolutionary governments. Second, it proposes a model that helps to understand the growing instability of revolutionary regimes, as well as conditions that undermine stability. In equilibrium, it is possible to have a revolutionary government overthrown by popular uprising, despite the fact that it gained power on the wave of popular support. Third, under a set of conditions, the new incumbent would always come from a different part of political spectrum.

Added: Aug 19, 2019
Article
Camboni R., Rondi L., Valbonesi P. European Journal of Political Economy. 2020.

We empirically compare bids (i.e. prices) from temporary partnerships (TPs), that outsource part of the contract before the auction, and firms that outsource afterwards. Using a comprehensive dataset on procurement auctions for public works in Valle d’Aosta (Italy), we find that the timing of outsourcing affects the bids and the probability of winning the auction. Specifically, TPs bid closer to the payoff maximizing offer and are more likely to win. Hence, the price paid by the public buyer is lower. These results are supported by a simple theoretical setting showing that, by pre-committing to a TP, suppliers have a lower risk of being “held up” by subcontractors than firms that outsource part of the work after the bidding phase. Our results show the advantage for TPs of freely choosing partners, size and boundaries before the auction, highlighting their potential in fostering the effective participation in public procurement procedures of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs).

Added: Dec 4, 2020
Article
Vasilyeva O., Libman A. European Journal of Political Economy. 2020. Vol. 63.

A broad literature suggests that political regimes matter for the growth effect of natural resources. However, while several studies have concentrated on the difference between democracies and autocracies in this respect, an important topic overlooked so far is the differences between varieties of authoritarian regimes. This study uses the political variation across sub-national regions of the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin to understand how differences in the extent of elite fragmentation in autocracies affects the influence of resource abundance on economic growth in the short run. We find that polities with fragmented elites underperform those with consolidated elites and link this effect to higher costs of fights over rents due to higher political uncertainty.

Added: Aug 2, 2021
Article
Vasilieva O., Libman A. European Journal of Political Economy. 2020. Vol. 63. P. 101869.

A broad literature suggests that political regimes matter for the growth effect of natural resources. However, while several studies have concentrated on the difference between democracies and autocracies in this respect, an important topic overlooked so far is the differences between varieties of authoritarian regimes. This study uses the political variation across sub-national regions of the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin to understand how differences in the extent of elite fragmentation in autocracies affects the influence of resource abundance on economic growth in the short run. We find that polities with fragmented elites underperform those with consolidated elites and link this effect to higher costs of fights over rents due to higher political uncertainty.

Added: Dec 9, 2020