A procedural egalitarian solution for NTU-games
This paper introduces and analyzes a procedural egalitarian solution for nontransferable utility games. This concept is based on an egalitarian procedure in which egalitarian opportunities of coalitions are explicitly taken into account. We formulate conditions under which the new solution prescribes a core element and derive a direct expression on the class of bargaining games and the class of bankruptcy games.
Drawing on the neo-institutional approach in organizational theory and global strategy, we advance a theory on the impact that differences in cultural egalitarianism have on multinational firms’ decision of where to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) across the globe. Egalitarianism expresses a society’s cultural orientation with respect to intolerance for abuses of market and political power; it shapes the ways in which firms holding power interact with different stakeholders. After presenting a series of case illustrations, we find a strong negative impact of egalitarianism distance on FDI flows in a broad sample of nations and for different entry modes. Our results are robust to a broad set of competing accounts, including effects from other cultural dimensions, major features of the legal and regulatory regimes, other features of the institutional system, and economic development. These results hold while controlling for origin and host country factors through a fixed-effects specification as well as by using instruments for egalitarianism. We also find that other cultural influences are important as well. Differences in cultural harmony are actually positively associated with increased FDI flows, likely because multinational firms seek countries with lower societal support for entrepreneurship. FDI further tends to flow from high embeddedness to low embeddedness countries, and we link this in part to international regulatory arbitrage on environmental protection regimes.
This study identifies how country differences on a key cultural dimension—egalitarianism— influence the direction of different types of international investment flows. A society's cultural orientation toward egalitarianism is manifested by intolerance for abuses of market and political power and a desire for protecting the weak and less powerful actors. We show egalitarianism to be based on exogenous factors including social fractionalization, dominant religion circa 1900, and war experience from the 19th century era of state formation. Controlling for a large set of competing explanations, we find a robust influence of egalitarianism distance on cross-national investment flows of bond and equity issuances, syndicated loans, and mergers and acquisitions. An informal cultural institution largely determined a century or more ago, egalitarianism exercises its effect on international investment via an associated set of consistent contemporary policy choices. But even after controlling for these associated policy choices, egalitarianism continues to exercise a direct effect on cross-border investment flows, likely through its direct influence on managers’ daily business conduct.
This paper axiomatically studies the equal split-off set (cf. Branzei et al. (Banach Center Publ 71:39–46, 2006)) as a solution for cooperative games with transferable utility which extends the well-known Dutta and Ray (Econometrica 57:615–635, 1989) solution for convex games. By deriving several characterizations, we explore consistency of the equal split-off set on the domains of exact partition games and arbitrary games.