Фундамент «вертикали»: выборы и распределение межбюджетных трансфертов на местном уровне (Случаи Новгородской области и Пермского края)
Abstract. Over the last fifteen years municipalities in Russia have lost a significant part of their financial autonomy: the average share of transfers from regional budgets to municipal budgets has doubled. Simultaneously, mu- nicipalities have lost their political autonomy from the regional authorities. The article is dedicated to finding answers to such questions as whether the growth of the financial and political dependence of municipalities went hand in hand with the politicization of regional intergovernmental transfers and whether elec- tion results affect the amount of funds received by municipalities from regional budgets. The authors used an original dataset on two types of intergovernmental transfers, the distribution of which depends on regional authorities, for 70 mu- nicipalities of the Perm Krai and the Novgorod Oblast, 2013—2017.
The regression analysis conducted by the authors confirmed the hypothe- sis that redistribution of budgetary funds between municipalities is decided on political grounds, but this holds true only at the beginning of the electoral cy- cle, which is consistent with the model of rewarding a loyal electorate. As is the case at the federal level, this is about rewarding those who produce “good” electoral results and punishing those who produce “bad” electoral results rath- er than courting swing voters or buying off most problematic territories. The fact that the municipality has its own parliamentarian in the regional legisla- ture can also contribute to obtaining more transfers. Municipal needs for in- frastructure have no impact on the size of transfers.