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Article

Психофизическая проблема: "кто" видит мир? (эскиз проблемы взаимоопосредования)

The question of the connection between the mental and the physical (body and soul), while preserving the value of one of the central problems of philosophy, intrigues not only philosophers, but also representatives of specific sciences, psychologists, physicists, logicians, semiotics with the difficulty of their consideration. In the last two centuries, new terms have appeared (“qualia”, “supervenience”, “emergence”, “philosophical zombie”), designed to help resolve the “difficult problem of consciousness” (D. Chalmers). But do these linguistic innovations provide significant progress in solving the old problem? The author believes that by updating the traditional discourse, they require substantial concrete definition, since they leave unclear the very criterion for distinguishing between “mental” and “physical” (without which the question of their correlation loses any meaning). The required criterion is described in the article as the transference (propagation “for”) non-transference (adherence to the place). “Physical” (waves, particles) retain their own properties outside the place of their origin, detecting transference (particles are transferred, waves propagate without changing their own properties); “Mental” (sensations, ideas, feelings, thoughts, emotions, aspirations, etc.) are non-transferential (they exist there and only where they originated). The difficulty of resolving the psychophysical problem is due to the “error of the beholder” - the nondiscrimination between sensible (represented) and supersensible (imaginable) elements. Mental phenomena are the result of the interaction of conceivable physical elements (following the example of wave interference and the formation of a “standing wave”). It is understood that one of the participants of the interaction ("co-producer") is the organic body of the individual (and, in particular, his brain). The hypothetical model of mental contents (metaphorical model) is an internal hologram generated by an individual and existing in a single copy. It is assumed that, having a structural character, it is capable of configuring the radiant energy of the body passing through it, thereby acting as a “formal” and “target” causes of behavior (in terms of Aristotle). Thus, the idea of ​​the epiphenomenality (redundancy) of the psyche in the organization of the activity of an individual is challenged. The exclusive nature of mental phenomena as internal holograms is particularly emphasized, since according to the initial hypothesis they are committed to the place of their origin, they cannot be fixed with the help of technical devices or, as they say, “with the eye”, “from the outside” (they cannot be “extracted”, “Peeped”, “transferred”, “photographed”, “pinned”, etc.). It is customary to say that the mental contents are “hidden from an outside observer” and at the same time “visible (experienced) only from the inside.” The author shows that the ideas about the “appearance of mental contents from the inside” are subject to critical consideration: the idea of ​​the “inner contemplator” gives rise to the idea of ​​“homunculi,” the bad infinity of the “little men” nested in each other. The author's thesis is that initially “there is no one inside who would see, experience, strive,” in other words, was the subject of inner life (“I”); “Contemplated” and “contemplator” are fragments of the phenomenal field, “commented” by culturally-given verbal signs (“I see,” “I imagine,” “I feel,” etc.). Some models of “I”, generated by the corporeality of an individual in a socio-cultural environment, exhibit the property of self-movement, causa sui. Thus, in general, the relationship between the mental and the physical is interpreted as their mutual mediation, - co-beingness; relations are not symmetrical: not the psyche - “for the body”, but the body - “for the psyche”