Public-Private Partnerships as Collaborative Projects: testing the theory on cases from EU and Russia
How do public-private partnerships (PPPs) differ from traditional public procurement and what role should governments play in them? This article views PPPs as collaborative projects with imperfect information between parties. Typical public procurement contracts tackle asymmetric information problems yet limit feasibility of projects: some are not profitable enough to ensure private party participation. Partnership improves feasibility; this justifies PPPs as a form of public good provision and demonstrates how they differ from procurement. Four UK and Russian cases of PPP projects are analyzed within the above framework, focusing on types of contracts, contributions of both partners, and specific partnership elements.
The article is devoted to the single budget account. The research on its basic characteristics allows the author to conclude that its use is effective.
The article discusses prospects of future developments in the field of Russian investment law. The author analyses new laws «On investment partnerships» and «On usiness partnerships», as well as certain draft laws. The author also deals with the perspectives of legal regulation of public-private partnerships as part of investment law.
This paper is dedicated to the reform of public accounting carried out by the tsar Alexander II in Russia.
For the last two decades many countries have developed Public-Private Partnership (PPP) and founded some management systems. Each of those countries has its own model of PPP taking into account specific aims and goals they pursue and priorities of their economic policy. Legislative and regulatory frameworks, administrative structures and functions of government authorities that are inherent in a given country, exert a great influence upon those models. In regard to this, the level of development of market economy and institutions of civil society and of legal culture (both offi cials and businessmen) is of great importance. The article is devoted to issues of PPP governance mostly in developed countries. The role of governing authorities in PPP implementation and their standing in the government structure have been disclosed and analysed, as well as their functions and outcome of their activities.
Proceedings of the 17th International Conference held in Šlapanice in the Czech Republic on 17-18 January 2013 at Masaryk University, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Department of Public Economics.
The paper addresses the existing cross-regional diversity of delivery models in the sector of suburban passenger transportation in Russia by building a formal model of endogenous organisational choice. We develop a conceptual game-theoretic framework that allows for a trusting partnership to have become equilibrium in a regulatory bargaining game with delegation. The monopoly service provider initiates a more cooperative relationship with regional authorities by offering a share in the joint venture. The latter being benevolent welfare maximiser either accepts or rejects the offer taking into account transportation market characteristics, local budget constraints, information structure, as well as socio-economic and political factors. Once the partnership is formed the private information of the parties is revealed and information rent is eliminated creating the room for welfare improvement. However, ex ante rational organisational choice to form a trusting partnership may not lead to welfare improvement ex post. In the extended model we consider how concessionary passengers and fare-dodgers affect the bargaining outcomes. Our results can be generalized to characterize the diversity of organizational choices in the public sector
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.