«Неортодоксальные» быстрорастущие фирмы-«газели» и порядок ограниченного доступа
The subject of the article is “unorthodox” gazelles — politically-connected
or big business-affiliated fast-growing firms. It is established that rents play
a significant role in the commercial success of such firms. Nevertheless, as
predicted by the well-known “limited access framework” (by D. North and coauthors),
and contrary to the standard interpretation of rents, the latter can
play a positive role in the transitional economy. The authors have identified
on empirical material some clearly positive scenarios among the main patterns
of the development of “unorthodox” gazelles in Russia. The article discusses
the conditions under which “unorthodox” gazelles can become an instrument of
We analyze political economy of Russian Vertical-of-Power in federal-regional aspects. In the year 2008 in Russia new president (the formal head of Russian government) was elected, in the next elections to come in the 2012 most probably that Putin is going to return his formal presidential chair. In this paper we test if governor appointed by new president followed by extra federal money (extra payments from federal budget to regional budget). There are two hypotheses: if new governor appointed by new president leads to significant increase in payments from federal budget to regional budget or there were no changes in payments from federal budget to regional budget. The data analysis confirms the first hypothesis.
In this article the original concept of political meaning of public trust and distrust is considered. Differently from usual interpretation of any distrust as unconditionally negative factor, the author offers more differentiated approach. He considers reasonable political distrust to power as a one of premises for political progress, because it is one of foundations for liberal ideology.