Ranking journals using social choice theory methods: A novel approach in bibliometrics
We use data on economic, management and political science journals to produce quan- titative estimates of (in)consistency of the evaluations based on six popular bibliometric indicators (impact factor, 5-year impact factor, immediacy index, article influence score, SNIP and SJR). We advocate a new approach to the aggregation of journal rankings. Since the rank aggregation is a multicriteria decision problem, ranking methods from social choice theory may solve it. We apply either a direct ranking method based on the majority rule (the Copeland rule, the Markovian method) or a sorting procedure based on a tournament solution, such as the uncovered set and the minimal externally stable set. We demonstrate that the aggregate rankings reduce the number of contradictions and represent the set of the single-indicator-based rankings better than any of the six rankings themselves.
This article describesseveral impossibility results in social choice theory and demonstrates their importance for democratic theory. Since 1950s social scientists paid a great attention to the investigation of collective decision-making. This interest led to the formation of a new field of study within economics and political science, social choice theory. The main resultsof this strand of research are various impossibilitytheorems which illustrateinconsistencies indifferentvoting rules. Arrow`s impossibility theorem is usually considered to bethe most important result of this kind: however, many other impossibility theorems were proved during the last fifty years, among them the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Amartya Sen's liberal paradox and discursive dilemma. These paradoxical findingsreveal serious inner defects of democratic decision-making and therefore challenge the democratic idea itself, which is presumably the central project of modern political thought. Therefore, they are of great interest for democratic theorists.
This chapter examines bibliometric indicators related to citedness of journals, authors, research groups, institutions and whole countries. The introductory section deals with the basics of bibliometric analysis and features of citation databases. The author discusses the usage of various bibliometric indicators: the impact factor, average citedness, share of uncited papers, Eigenfactor and Article Infl uence Scores, Hirsch and Hirsch-type indices, and others. A special section investigates indicators of chronological distribution of references. Particular attention is paid to normalized indicators, including indicators normalized by research disciplines, as well as by publication sources. The fi nal section emphasizes the importance of informed and reasonable use of bibliometric indicators in research policy-making, funding allocation, and faculty and research personnel recruitment.
Originally published in 1951, Social Choice and Individual Valuesintroduced “Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem” and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science. This new edition, including a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, reintroduces Arrow’s seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers.
"Far beyond a classic, this small book unleashed the ongoing explosion of interest in social choice and voting theory. A half-century later, the book remains full of profound insight: its central message, ‘Arrow’s Theorem,’ has changed the way we think.”—Donald G. Saari, author of Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected
Kenneth J. Arrow is professor of economics emeritus, Stanford University, and a Nobel laureate. Eric S. Maskin is Albert O. Hirschman Professor, School of Social Science, Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ, and a Nobel laureate.
When a society needs to take a collective decision one could apply some aggregation method, particularly, voting. One of the main problems with voting is manipulation. We say a voting rule is vulnerable to manipulation if there exists at least one voter who can achieve a better voting result by misrepresenting his or her preferences. The popular approach to comparing manipulability of voting rules is defining complexity class of the corresponding manipulation problem. This paper provides a survey into manipulation complexity literature considering variety of problems with different assumptions and restrictions.
Aleskerov et al.  and  estimated the degree of manipulability for the case of multi-valued choice (without using any tie-breaking rule) and for Impartial Culture (IC). In our paper, we address the similar question for the multi-valued choice and for Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC). We use Nitzan-Kelly's (NK) index to estimate the degree of manipulability, which is calculated as the share of all manipulable voting situations, and calculate indices for 3 alternatives and up to 10000 voters. We have found that for the case of 3 alternatives Nanson's procedure shows the best results. Hare's procedure shows close, but a bit higher results. The worst aggregation procedure in terms of manipulability is Plurality rule. Additionally, it turned out that NK indices for IAC are smaller than NK indices for IC.
In the article the classification of indicators of efficiency of scientific activity, and also the list of criteria which they should satisfy are suggested. The indicator of productivity of scientific activity used in Russia (IPSA) is analyzed and its limitation for measurement of the results of scientific activity is proved. New IPSA, the technique of their calculation and the way of calculation of the wages of the faculty on the basis of these indicators are worked out.
scientific activity, a productivity indicator, a citing index, the impact factor
In 2006, Russia amended its competition law and added the concepts of ‘collective dominance’ and its abuse. This was seen as an attempt to address the common problem of ‘conscious parallelism’ among firms in concentrated industries. Critics feared that the enforcement of this provision would become tantamount to government regulation of prices. In this paper we examine the enforcement experience to date, looking especially closely at sanctions imposed on firms in the oil industry. Some difficulties and complications experienced in enforcement are analysed, and some alternative strategies for addressing anticompetitive behaviour in concentrated industries discussed.