Понятие намерения в философии действия Г.Э.М. Энском

Социологическое обозрение. 2018. Т. 17. № 2. С. 87–114.

Mishura A.

This article is devoted to the philosophy of action of Elisabeth Anscombe. Anscombe’s theory of intentional action was presented in her monograph "Intention" (1957), which is by now an acknowledged classics of the analytic philosophy. "Intention" established the field of the analytic philosophy of action, it defined the main problems of this field and largely determined its further development. However, the study of "Intention" is complicated by the author’s methodology, her writing style and the lack of clear summary of results at the end of her enquiry. The aim of this paper is to present Anscombe’s theory of intentional action in as comprehensible way as it is possible without oversimplifying her genuine thought. The first part of the paper contains some brief biographical information about Anscombe’s life and philosophical development, the social and philosophical context of "Intention", and its place in the Anscombe’s philosophy in general. The second part of the paper explains the basic structure of "Intention", states its general task, presents the central line of reasoning and the main arguments, highlights the particular theses and questions that significantly influenced the formation and development of the analytical philosophy of action. The resulting interpretation demonstrates that Anscombe’s theory passes between the extremes of different versions of Cartesian dualism, on the one hand, and the complete negation of the significance of the mental in the theory of action, on the other.

Keywords: action, действие, философия действия, intention, намерение, philosophy of action, Anscombe, intentional action, Энском, намеренное действие

Publication based on the results of: Динамические модели в аналитической метафизике и философии языка (2017)