The future of domestic politics
Since his rise to power in 2000 Vladimir Putin has had two major priorities: ‘control’ at home and ‘sovereignty’ on the world scene. The importance of these two priorities has not eclipsed other goals, such as economic development, but the latter has always been secondary to the foremost priorities cited above. Throughout the ‘softer’ period of his rule, up until his presidential comeback in 2012, Putin was able to balance his main and his secondary objectives: the economy kept growing while domestically Putin set about systematically removing political opposition and competition, and ensured unchallenged power for himself. He successfully resisted the attempts of the West to interfere in Russian domestic affairs, but the Russian economy benefited from lucrative economic cooperation with Western nations. However, by the time Putin returned to the Kremlin to begin his third presidential term in 2012 the economy had stopped growing. Combined with a decline in the regime’s legitimacy (the most striking illustration of which were the mass protests of 2011-2012) this marked a turning point: Putin was no longer able to balance his top priorities and national development objectives. The annexation of Crimea (overwhelmingly seen in Russia as the righting of an historical injustice and a victorious achievement that echoed Russia’s glorious victory in the Great Patriotic War) generated nation-wide nationalist euphoria and universal approval of Putin as the nation’s leader. The regime’s legitimacy was thus reaffirmed, but it was no longer a legitimacy derived from the electoral process, but rather a ‘military legitimacy’ predicated on the portrayal of Russia as a fortress under siege. The ‘besieged fortress’ mindset was further entrenched by the subsequent war in Donbass accompanied by aggressive anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian propaganda, followed by the 2015 airstrikes in Syria and a dramatic confrontation with Turkey. By the end of 2015 the broadly shared popular perception was that Russia had finally regained the great power status1 it lost after the collapse of the USSR. However, although Putin may have enhanced Russia’s sovereignty and consolidated his control inside the country, these priorities have come at a rapidly rising cost to the Russian economy, the country’s social capital and other spheres of life.
It is shown in the paper, that the probability of economy’s transition to innovative forms of development largely depends on the type of logic according to which economic agents evaluate the role, utility and feasibility of technological innovation as a component of development strategies of firms.
The drive for “authoritarian modernization” provides incentives for the government to bypass democratic institutions and circumvent public discussions, similarly to what happened in education reform in the 2000s; or, alternatively, the government would go for a partial policy compromise, which may have satisfied major interest groups at the expense of policy efficiency, similarly to the case of the 2000-2001 pension reform. However, the 2000-2001 labor reform in Russia (analysed in this chapter) was adopted with the genuine use of democratic mechanisms and procedures. Moreover, the reformers proved successful in the process of selecting among policy alternatives and building a coalition to support the reform, which they managed to accomplish with only relatively minor compromises. This case study demonstrates that the government can squeeze unpopular reforms through the parliament without relying upon an “authoritarian modernization” model if its policies are backed by a strong and popular president and when its efforts to secure the support of various actors prove enough to build a broad informal coalition of supporters. The case of labor reform is also revealing because there were two full-fledged attempts at this reform in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and only the latter succeeded. This allows us to trace the ultimate policy success back to the factors that conditioned it in the second try but were lacking in the first attempt, and to consider some effects of policy learning.
This chapter seeks to provide a detailed account of the policy process that led to the adoption of the pension reform in Russia in 2001. Focusing on the major actors involved in the elaboration of the reform concept and their preferences, I show that the 2001 Russian pension reform appeared to be a compromise squared for the liberal insiders of Kasyanov’s government and, most of all, for Mikhail Dmitriev, a major driver and proponent of the market-oriented reform. As the 2000-2001 attempts to reform pensions in Russia were not the first of such endeavours, a previous attempt to introduce a model of privatization into the Russian pension system, carried out by the “young reformers” government in 1997-1998, is also examined in this chapter. This analysis helps us to identify the network of policy actors involved in the bargaining at the turn of the century (namely, distinguishing the “old” bureaucracy from the Ministry of Labour and the liberal reformers who were invited by Anatoly Chubais from the outside to elaborate the reform). Also, I show how the “window of opportunities” which opened when Vladimir Putin became the Russian president in spring 2000, in fact, limited the liberal reformers’ room for manoeuvre as the newly elected president chose to stake on the “old” bureaucracy as the backbone of the regime in the earliest stage of his presidency.
The paper shows the connection of the normative-value system of Russians with the existing type of Russian society. On a large empirical data estimated specificity and stage of sociocultural modernization experienced by contemporary Russian society .
Истражујући историјске везе Србије и Русије стиче се утисак да је у досадашњем времену већа пажња поклањана уметничким, културним, духовним и политичким, а знатно мање економским односима наших држава и народа. Управо због тога историјат економских веза нема тако богату прошлост, какав је случај са дугом традицијом и богатством српско-руске сарадње на осталим пољима. Први документи о економској сарадњи ове две земље потичу из 15. века када су први трговци путовали из Србије у Русију и обратно. Србија је први кредит од Русије добила 1867. године за изградњу железнице од Радујевца до Ниша. У новије време економски односи се значајно интензивирају и може се рећи они сада представљају прву и главну линију српско-руске сарадње. Србија је са Русијом 2000. године склопила Споразум о слободној трговини који омогућава нашој земљи да преко 95% домаћих производа извезе у Русију без царине. То је веома важан адут наше земље у привлачењу страних инвестиција, али и у бољем искоришћавању сопствених ресурса кроз покривање тражње на огромном руском тржишту. Србија и Русија су током 2008. године закључиле Споразум о сарадњи у нафтногасној области и Меморандум о разумевању за реализацију гасовода ЈУЖНИ ТОК, чија изградња је почела крајем 2012. године. Ради се о крупном и изузетно значајном пројекту чијом реализацијом ће се обезбедити енергетска сигурност наше земље, уз низ пратећих погодности за убрзани економски развој читаве привреде. Највећа руска банка СБЕРБАНКА започела је пословање у нашој земљи, а у најави су и стратешко партнерство руских компанија са смедеревском железаром, као и улагања у читав низ пројеката у нашој земљи. Под повољним условима започиње реализација руског кредита у износу од 800 милиона долара намењеног реконструкцији и модернизацији наших железница, а ускоро се очекује нови кредитни аранжман од једне милијарде долара. Велике инвестиције очекују се кроз војно-техничку сарадњу, као и на реализацији читавог низа других развојних пројеката. Потпуно је излишна дилема да ли се Србија окреће истоку или западу. Најбоља је солуција за све да Србија буде мост за повезивање истока и запада, пре свега у економској, али и не мање важним подручјима културне, научне, безбедносне, политичке и сваке друге корисне сарадње која ће бити на ползу земљама и народима који се у ту сарадњу укључују.
The article examines partnerships for modernisation between Russia, on the one hand, and the EU as well as 23 out of its 28 member states, on the other hand. In doing that it first identifies the difference between the Russian economic interpretation of modernisation and the EU's one based on political values. The article then demonstrates the ambiguity rather than singularity of the position that EU member states promote in their modernisation partnerships with Russia. To illustrate the difference among EU member states’ the article designs a scale of Russia’s sensitivity to various political aspects of modernization and then posits member states on this scale on the basis of their national partnerships for modernisation with Russia. As a result, a new classification of EU member states emerges; it is based on the extent, to which they are ready to defend the political definition of modernisation (and ultimately the EU's normative power) in their relations with Russia.
The article deals with the processes of building the information society and security in the CIS in accordance with modern conditions. The main objective is to review existing mechanisms for the formation of a common information space in the Eurasian region, regarded as one of the essential aspects of international integration. The theoretical significance of the work is to determine the main controls of the regional information infrastructure, improved by the development of communication features in a rapid process.The practical component consists in determining the future policies of the region under consideration in building the information society. The study authors used historical-descriptive approach and factual analysis of events having to do with drawing the contours of today's global information society in the regional refraction.
The main result is the fact that the development of information and communication technologies, and network resources leads to increased threats of destabilization of the socio-political situation in view of the emergence of multiple centers that generate the ideological and psychological background. Keeping focused information policy can not be conceived without the collective participation of States in the first place, members of the group leaders of integration - Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Currently, only produced a comprehensive approach to security in the information field in the Eurasian region, but the events in the world, largely thanks to modern technology, make the search for an exit strategy with a much higher speed. The article contributes to the science of international relations, engaging in interdisciplinary thinking that is associated with a transition period in the development of society. A study of current conditions in their relation to the current socio-political patterns of the authors leads to conclusions about the need for cooperation with the network centers of power in the modern information environment, the formation of alternative models of networking, especially in innovation and scientific and technical areas of information policy, and expanding the integration of the field in this region on the information content.
This article is talking about state management and cultural policy, their nature and content in term of the new tendency - development of postindustrial society. It mentioned here, that at the moment cultural policy is the base of regional political activity and that regions can get strong competitive advantage if they are able to implement cultural policy successfully. All these trends can produce elements of new economic development.