Толкование и применение права как творческий процесс
In legal interpretation, where does meaning come from? Law is made from language, yet law, unlike other language-related disciplines, has not so far experienced its “pragmatic turn” towards inference and the construction of meaning. This book investigates to what extent a pragmatically-based view of linguistic and legal interpretation can lead to new theoretical views for law and, in addition, to practical consequences in legal decision-making. With its traditional emphasis on “the letter of the law” and the immutable stability of a text as legal foundation, law has been slow to take the pragmatic perspective: namely, the language-user’s experience and activity in making meaning. More accustomed to literal than to pragmatic notions of meaning, that is, “in” the text rather than constructed by speakers and hearers … the disciplines of law may be culturally resistant to the pragmatic turn. By bringing together the different but complementary perspectives of pragmaticians and lawyers, this book addresses the issue of to what extent legal meaning can be productively analysed as deriving from resources beyond the text, … beyond the letter of the law. This collection re-visits the feasibility of the notion of literal meaning for legal interpretation and, at the same time, the feasibility of pragmatic meaning for law. Can explications of pragmatic meaning support court actions in the same way concepts of literal meaning have traditionally supported statutory interpretations and court judgements? What are the consequences of a user-based view of language for the law, in both its practices of interpretation and its definition of itself as a field? Readers will find in this collection means of approaching such questions, and promising routes for inquiry into the genre- and field-specific characteristics of inference in law. In many respects, the problem of literal vs. pragmatic meaning, confined to the text vs. reaching beyond it, will appear to parallel the dichotomy in law between textualism and intentionalism. There are indeed illuminating connections between the pair of linguistic terms and the more publicly controversial legal ones. But the parallel is not exact, and the linguistic dichotomy is in any case anterior to the legal one. Even as linguistic-pragmatic investigation may serve legal domains, the legal questions themselves point back to central conditions of all linguistic meaning.
The author criticizes the neorealist conception of legal interpretation defended by Michel Troper. It is stressed that the neorealist approach to interpretation does not allow proving its own theses from a scientific standpoint. Subjectivist and voluntarist understanding of interpretation leads neorealism to a sociological conception of law. This understanding does not catch the most essential characteristics of legal phenomena.
The article analyses interpretation of the articles of the European Convention on Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which guarantee the right to private and family life, to marry, to access court and to be free from arbitrary detention in the context of formal equality and non-discrimination for the persons with mental disabilities. The author argues that the judges of international courts interpret human rights language not literally, but broadly, pragmatically – involving comparative legal studies, judicial practice of different states, fact analysis for the better protection of fundamental rights of the applicants, thus employing compensatory possibilities of law for the equalization of the possibilities to access the rights for the persons, belonging to disadvantages groups.
This short analysis of the case-law of the RF CC allows distinguishing several pivotal axes around which is centred the argumentation of that Court. First, it is the constitutional order that delimits the freedoms of legal subjects with some mandatory requirements and this way makes triumph the collective over the individual. In the same vein the Court agrees to restrict the freedoms for the sake of national security that guarantees survival and development of the society. Nonetheless, collective rights are not equivalent to the collective interests (volonté générale, if to follow the terms of J.-J. Rousseau), these latter are represented not by collectives but by the State that stands both over the individuals and the collectives. The State may in its activities be guided by the underpinning social conventions, but this guidance is limited by the principle of reasonableness following which the State (in fact, its agents) can decide about the extent to which they are ready to recognise these social conventions as reasons for action. It can be interfered that in this aspect one may assert that in the reasoning of the RF CC the collective interest prevails over the individual one, and the both are subordinated to the reasonable guidance of the State.
The author of this paper responds to the critique of the realist theory of interpretation made by O. Pfersmann. M. Troper insists that critique of his theory is based on the incorrect philosophical generalizations. The realist theory considers that it is impossible to find an objective meaning of legal texts also through judicial process. Thus, claiming at the same time that judicial decisions are the main source of knowledge about law and that these decisions do not have objective meaning does not lead to any internal contradictions in this theory.
In this article the author resumes the debates about sustainability of the neo-realist theory of legal interpretation. Pfersmann meticulously analyses the new arguments of his adversary, Michel Troper, and criticizes these arguments. Neo-realism recurs to content-analysis of legal texts as of speech acts, which is not possible without semantics, but at the same time it denies using any semantic arguments. Another inconsistency results in that any normative hierarchy in law being rejected by neo-realism, and this amounts to impossibility to identify any legal texts and any legal order. Pfersmann also stresses that normative effects of interpretation are connected not with any factual actions, but with normative structure of a legal order. The author concludes that the neo-realist theory of interpretation meets with failure for lack of a proper object and a coherent method of scientific inquiry.
The article is devoted to a particular form of freedom of assembly — the right to counter-demonstrate. The author underlines the value of this right as an element of democratic society, but also acknowledges the risk of violent actions among participants of opposing demonstrations. Due to this risk, the government may adopt adequate measures restricting the right to counter-demonstrate, certain types of which are analyzed in this paper.
Development of standards of international controllability is reviewed in the article. Institutional approach is applied to development of international legal regime of Energy Charter. Definition of controllability is connected to development of international standards of dispute settlement, which are described in the article in detail. In connection with controllability, Russian interest, defense of investment in European Union and ecological investment encouragement, is reviewed in the article.
мировое управление и управляемость, Мировая экономика, международное экономическое право, энергетическая хартия, International control and controllability, International economics, international economic law, Energy Charter
международное частное право; недвижимость; ; школа бартолистов; бартолисты; теория статутов; статуарная теория/