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Теория без объекта, доктрина без теории. В качестве ответа Мишелю Троперу
In this article the author resumes the debates about sustainability of the neo-realist theory of legal interpretation. Pfersmann meticulously analyses the new arguments of his adversary, Michel Troper, and criticizes these arguments. Neo-realism recurs to content-analysis of legal texts as of speech acts, which is not possible without semantics, but at the same time it denies using any semantic arguments. Another inconsistency results in that any normative hierarchy in law being rejected by neo-realism, and this amounts to impossibility to identify any legal texts and any legal order. Pfersmann also stresses that normative effects of interpretation are connected not with any factual actions, but with normative structure of a legal order. The author concludes that the neo-realist theory of interpretation meets with failure for lack of a proper object and a coherent method of scientific inquiry.