Экономическая честность и экономический человек. Заметки на работу И. И. Янжула "Экономическое значение честности (забытый фактор производства)"
The «honesty-success» alternative decision is the result of a moral choice for every member of the academic community. The this choice social assess-ment depends on the ethoses configuration in concrete society.
In the present paper the game theory is applied to an important open question in economics: providing microfoundations for often-used types of production function. Simple differential games of bargaining are proposed to model a behavior of workers and capital-owners in processes of formation of a set of admissible factor prices or participants’ weights (moral-ethical assessments). These games result, correspondingly, in a factor price curve and a weight curve – structures dual to production function. Ultimately, under constant bargaining powers of the participants, the Cobb-Douglas production function is received.
A new approach is proposed revealing duality relations between a physical side of economy (resources and technologies) and its institutional side (institutional relationsd between social groups). Production function is modeled not as a primal object but rather as a secondary one defined in a dual way by the institutional side. Differential games of bargaining are proposed to model a behavior of workers and capitalists in process of prices or weights formation. These games result, correspondingly, in a price curve and in a weight curve - structures dual to a production function. Ultimately, under constant bargaining powers of the participants, the Cobb-Douglas production function is generated.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.