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Article

Поле битвы: свобода воли

Логос. 2016. Т. 26. № 5. С. 19-58.

This article gives a survey of the contemporary debates on the problem of free will and discusses some of the metaphysical assumptions underlying these debates. The first part of the paper provides a critical overview of the most influential positions on the problem of freedom and determinism: compatibilism, libertarianism and hard incompatibilism. It discusses the limitations of G.E. Moore’s hypothetical analysis of the ability to do otherwise and the problems of the psychological accounts of free action in contemporary compatibilism. It briefly examines contemporary libertarian theories of free will by criticizing the agent-causal theories of freedom, and by showing the innovative character of R. Kane’s theory of Ultimate Responsibility. Hard incompatibilism is criticized because of its methodological deficiencies in exploring the prospects of living without freedom of will.

            The second part of the paper is devoted to the analysis of the metaphysical assumptions behind these debates. First, it criticizes the foundations of the thesis that causal determinism actually obtains in our world. It argues that causal determinism is not a plausible thesis both in its “objective” and in its “subjective” versions. Second, it discusses some of the motivating ideas for the development of libertarian accounts of free will. Nonstandard libertarian approaches to free will are proposed in order to uncover these motivating ideas. This helps to explain the structural similarities between libertarianism and compatibilism and to show “the dogma of control” ruling in the contemporary debates about freedom.