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Regular version of the site

Article

One dimensional mechanism design

Theoretical Economics. 2017. Vol. 12. No. 2. P. 587-619.

We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation pro…les cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem ([10], [21]) and the division of a non disposable commodity by the uniform rationing rule ([48]). We construct a canonical peak-only rule equalizing in the leximin sense individual gains from an arbitrary benchmark allocation: it is ef…cient, group-strategyproof, fair, and (for most problems) continuous. These properties leave room for many other rules, except for symmetric non disposable division problems.