Об устойчивости равновесия в сетевой игре с производством и внешними эффектами
We consider a network model of production with externalities which describes a situationtypical for many economic, social, and political systems. In the first period of time each of the agents in the network receives endowment and distributes it between consumption and investment. In the second period the agent’s consumption depends on its own investment as well as on investments of its neighbors. The agent’s benefit is determined by its consumption in the two periods. We introduce adjustment dynamics into this model and study the problem of stability of the game equilibrium. An important factwhich we have discovered in our research is the special role of the conditions of the presence and the absence of productivity both in a static and in a dynamic framework. The specifics of the dynamics and the nature of the resulting equilibrium depend on the parameters of the model and on the character of the initial disturbance. We have found the instability of the inner equilibrium and have studied the convergence to a new corner equilibrium and the stability of the latter. The instability of the inner equilibria, which we found and the sources of which we study, is the property typical for social and economic systems. The presence of many social institutions can be explained by the wish of the members of the society to preserve the existing equilibria under the dynamic instability which would take place without such stabilizing institutions.
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the amount of investment in knowledge when one of the network firms enters another innovation network. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how innovative companies will behave when deciding whether to enter the innovation network of another country or region, what conditions affect it and how the level of future investments in knowledge can be predicted.
This article analyzes a sequential search model where firms face identical but stochastic production costs, the realizations of which are unknown to consumers. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying a reservation price property and provide a sufficient condition for such an equilibrium to exist. We show that (i) firms set on average higher prices and make larger profits compared to the scenario where consumers observe production costs, (ii) expected prices and consumer welfare can be non-monotonic in the number of firms, and (iii) the impact of production cost uncertainty vanishes as the number of firms becomes very large.
In this paper we consider games with preference relations. The cooperative aspect of a game is connected with its coalitions. The main optimality concepts for such games are concepts of equilibrium and acceptance. We introduce a notion of coalition homomorphism for cooperative games with preference relations and study a problem concerning connections between equilibrium points (acceptable outcomes) of games which are in a homomorphic relation. The main results of our work are connected with finding of covariant and contravariant homomorphisms.
Smoking is a problem, bringing signifi cant social and economic costs to Russiansociety. However, ratifi cation of the World health organization Framework conventionon tobacco control makes it possible to improve Russian legislation accordingto the international standards. So, I describe some measures that should be taken bythe Russian authorities in the nearest future, and I examine their effi ciency. By studyingthe international evidence I analyze the impact of the smoke-free areas, advertisementand sponsorship bans, tax increases, etc. on the prevalence of smoking, cigaretteconsumption and some other indicators. I also investigate the obstacles confrontingthe Russian authorities when they introduce new policy measures and the public attitudetowards these measures. I conclude that there is a number of easy-to-implementanti-smoking activities that need no fi nancial resources but only a political will.
One of the most important indicators of company's success is the increase of its value. The article investigates traditional methods of company's value assessment and the evidence that the application of these methods is incorrect in the new stage of economy. So it is necessary to create a new method of valuation based on the new main sources of company's success that is its intellectual capital.