Diversification and control in emerging markets: the case of Chilean firms
We analyze the effect of two types of corporate diversification (business diversification and ownership diversification) on the market value of the Chilean firms. For a sample of 83 nonfinancial firms listed on the Santiago Stock Market from 2005 to 2013, we find a discount for both business and ownership diversification, which is consistent with that reported for other economic or institutional settings. Second, we find that the business diversification discount is related to the ownership structure and is due to the excess of the largest shareholders’ control rights. Third, we find that the ownership diversification discount becomes a premium when the ownership diversification enables the control of the affiliated firms. This effect can be explained by the improvement of internal capital markets that allows overcoming the limitations of Chilean external capital markets.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of the corporate ownership diversification, i.e. how the involvement in the ownership of other non-financial firms affects the value of listed firms. The authors control for the unrelated diversification when the firm has different business segments in different sectors. Design/methodology/approach - The authors analyze a sample of Chilean-listed firms between 2005 and 2009, in two stages. First, the authors compute the diversification premium or discount, defined as the part of the firms' capitalization that stems from the diversification strategy. Then, the authors regress the premium or discount against the business and ownership diversification measures and other control variables. Findings - In addition to a discount for unrelated business diversification, the authors find an ownership diversification discount when non-financial firms are shareholders of other firms. However, this discount turns into a premium when the firm gains the control of the owned firm, especially in related sectors. Originality/value - The authors pioneer the analysis of the ownership diversification in Latin American firms. The results apply not only to Chile but also to a number of Latin American countries since many of these countries have, in common with Chile, a concentrated corporate ownership structure and a weak protection of investors' rights.
We study the relationship between SMS (small medium size) firm ownership structure and obstacle to finance. The empirical research considers both the concentration of the company's ownership (controlling owner) and the presence of foreign participants in the equity capital. Our aim is to identify those determinants of financial markets (bond market development), legal institutions and firms characteristics in the transition economies of the post soviet countries that can be considered as barriers to attracting financial resources. This paper sheds light on large shareholders’ influence on obstacle to finance.
The level of corporate diversification is one of the most important decisions that management makes. The diversification strategy has its benefits and costs. According to the principles of corporate finance the efficiency of diversification strategy is always assessed by its impact on shareholder value. The article discusses the main value-creating and value-destroying drivers of diversified firms.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.