In accordance with the international investment legislation, a state is entitled to implement expropriation and nationalization measures with respect to foreign investments within its territory on condition of guaranteed prompt, efficient and adequate compensation provision in favor of investors. The article notes that there is no clear description of the phenomenon of foreign investors' property alienation in the Russian or world practice. Consideration is given to the types of expropriation: direct, aimed at deprivation of property rights for investments by authorities; indirect, or "creeping" expropriation representing gradual divestiture; and measures that are equivalent to expropriation and inhibit receipts of investment benefits. It is underscored that in the process of investment evaluation it is necessary to take into consideration the degree of intervention in property rights, intentions of the government, and the impossibility to discharge adequate investors' expectations.
This article discusses the objectives and challenges for corporate governance of SOEs in Russia, and provides an international perspective of the performance of SOEs as compared to privately owned companies. Recent trends in the policy and management of state property are described. The problems of corporate governance in Russia are described in an agency perspective, and survey evidence on corporate governance and transparency of Russian SOEs is provided. Particular attention is given to the legal construction of the state corporation. The final section on the performance effects of state ownership summarizes the key contributions in the international economic literature in this field.
The article highlights the activities of the Russian economic Association in London, the role and place of Jews from Russia in its activities. For the short period of its existence (until 1923) the members of the society drew on the most vulnerable element of Russian communism is its economic component.