The book contains the proceedings of the 22nd Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference, held at University of Chicago in Chicago, Illinois, May 18 - May 20, 2012, edited by Anca Chereches.
This volume contains the proceedings of the annual Sinn und Bedeutung conference, held at Untrecht University, the Netherlands, 2011.
This paper focuses on the connection between “four-category ontologies” (which are based on Aristotle’s ontological square) and modern type-theoretical semantics. Four- category ontologies make a distinction between four types of entities: substantial universals, substantial particulars, accidental universals and accidental particulars. According to B. Smith, “fantology is a doctrine to the effect that the key to the ontological structure of reality is captured syntactically in the ‘Fa’ ”. Smith argues that predicate logic cannot adequately describe these four types of entities, which are reduced to just two kinds — the general (‘F’) and the particular (‘a’). B. Smith has criticized G. Frege’s predicate logic. He argues that Frege, being the father of modern logic, simultaneously became the father of “fantology” with its ontological commitments. Smith transforms the ontological square to the ontological sextet (which also involves universal and particular events) and proposes a set of predicates for different ontological relations connecting these six types of entities. However, Smith’s approach has a number of limitations: he suggests a theory that describes only predicates of different types as universals. We argue for another formalization for the ontological square’s entities. This approach i based on modern type-theoretical semantics, according to which, the difference between substantial universals and accidental universals can be expressed. In first-order logic the sentences “Socrates is a man” and “Socrates is wise” share the same logical form. However, this fact is not consistent with “ontological square” metaphysics (“being a man” is a substantial universal and “being wise” is an accidental universal). Whereas, according to the type-theoretical approach, relations to accidental universals are expressed by judgments about type (a : A), but relations to accidental universals are expressed by predication (‘P a’).
Uncontroversially, the meaning of first and second person pronouns and “imposters”, i.e. expressions like yours truly, (Collins and Postal 2012), should be indexical (Kaplan 1977/1989, Stalnaker 1970), but how exactly this indexicality is achieved has been a matter of some debate. While not settling the debate, this paper aims to show that there is no single way to become a person indexical. Natural language allows for at least three different represen- tations leading to person indexicality. Evidence for this comes from sentences involving imposters and pronouns coreferent with or bound by them. Partic- ularly telling are cases of variation between third and non-third pronouns in sentences with imposters, first discussed by Collins and Postal. Constraints on this variation support the view that it is not adequate from either an empirical or an explanatory perspective to treat all person indexicals uniformly.