How Do Universities Degrade? Toward a Formulation of the Problem
The paper analyses possible reasons for degradation of a variety of public universities in Russia. On the basis of indepth interviews with representatives of failing universities singled out according to objective data, external and internal factors for their degradation are revealed.
The article examines the issue of differences in the dividend policy of public and private companies in Russia. State corporations form more than 40% of revenues of the largest Russian companies, at the same time the role of ownership structure in determining dividend policy is not uniquely determined in the literature. Comparative analysis of Russian companies shows that nonlinear dependence is possible. We use panel data from nonfinancial companies listed in Moscow stock exchange from 2008 to 2016, who paid dividends during this period, 150 companies in total. Three specifications are considered: the one with dividend payout ratio as a dependent variable, the one with a share of dividends in free cash flow, and the one with nonlinear dependence of dividend payout ratio and share of state participation. Control variables are based on the life-cycle theory. Linear form does not show statistically significant relationship between the dividend payments and the shares of state participation. We find that the relationship is nonlinear and has the upside down U shape. For a low level of state participation, the relationship is positive, for a high level it is negative. This result is in line with the agency theory: a positive link indicates the use of dividends to resolve an agency conflict; a negative link implies concentration of money in the hands of managers in the absence of the power of minority shareholders. The future research is associated with adding institutional constraints to the analysis and using the framework of sustainable development of the firm.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.