Применение ключевых показателей эффективности для ФАС России: анализ на основе статистики судебных решений
Outcomes of key performance indicators application for the assessment of public authority performance are ambiguous. Theory of incentive contracts as well as international experience highlight the difficulties and possible externalities of KPI setting for public authority. Motivation system often distorts the incentives of public authorities, and applied indicators do not correctly reflect the priorities of enforcement for the society. One specific example is the assessment of performance of the Russian competition authority. In the paper we analyze the peculiarities of formation of ratio of the infringement decisions coming into legal force to all the infringement decisions made by competition authorities applied as one of key performance indicators. Using the data of the database of judicial reviews of infringement decisions, we show that the assessment of FAS performance based on the share of infringement decisions coming into legal force, distorts the incentives of the authority substantially. It motivates competition authority for making the large number of infringement decisions with the low probability to reverse but the low positive impact on consumer surplus and total welfare.
The Association of antitrust experts, together with FAS Russia, has prepared a new review of administrative appeal practices for the I quarter of 2020. The document discusses the most relevant positions of the FAS Presidium and appeal commissions, which the Antimonopoly authorities will use when considering similar and comparable cases.
The paper studies the specific features of trade-off between type I and type II errors in vertical restraints regulation. It pays attention to possible deviations from trade-off logic due to separate consideration of enforcement errors and some imperfections of Russian legal rules. The game theoretic model which is discussed in the second part of the article can be useful for formal analysis of externalities created by the enforcement errors.
The article explains an approach to the economic analysis in antitrust enforcement in Russia during twenty-five years of development. Based on adoption of European-style competition rules it is worth seeing how the industrial organization and competition economic models are applied during transition from socialist to market economy. The most specific feature, among the standards of enforcement, is the prevalence of enforcement against unilateral exploitative conduct of a large company that is not directly related to the restrictions of competition. Not only harm but individual harm is central and often sufficient evidence of competition legislation violation. Both the intellectual and technological legacies of transition, industrial structure of the economy and supportive institutions explain the unique application of theoretical models as a background for the actions of Russian antitrust authority.
Nowadays, the formation and development of an asset management system of "Russian Grids" is one of the key processes and priorities of the company, covering all levels of strategy. On the one hand, the relevance of finding an optimal asset management strategy is caused by a necessity to synchronize the strategies of different business levels with the company’s strategy and to transmit the relationships between the strategies into the key performance indicators of business processes. On the other hand, all the subsidiaries of "Russian Grids" are at different levels of development, and the same goals could not be achieved by all companies at the same time. This article considers one of the possible approaches to searching an optimal asset management strategy for subsidiaries under the general direction of unified asset management strategy development and the corporate strategy. The asset management strategy choice depends on the level of its maturity and efficiency of the company with condition of necessity to synchronize the strategies of different business levels and to decompose relationships between these strategies through corresponding key performance indicators.
The Association of antitrust experts, together with FAS Russia, has prepared a new review of administrative appeal practices for the III quarter of 2019. The document discusses the most relevant positions of the FAS Presidium and appeal commissions, which the Antimonopoly authorities will use when considering similar and comparable cases.
The Association of antitrust experts, together with FAS Russia, has prepared a new review of administrative appeal practices for the IV quarter of 2019. The document discusses the most relevant positions of the FAS Presidium and appeal commissions, which the Antimonopoly authorities will use when considering similar and comparable cases.
Key performance indicators (KPI) present an effective, high-precision framework for continuous monitoring of target achievements. The KPI framework has proved itself to be a functional tool within different economic sectors in series of large and mid-size companies. Notwithstanding all ad- vantages and effects of the implementation of KPI framework, it cannot be used for assessment and monitoring of operational risk level that was accepted for achievement of defined targets. Switching towards a risk-balanced approach in process management requires the definition and implementation of framework for monitoring the compliance of company risk-profile with its risk-tolerance. This requirement results in a key risk indicators KRI framework. The article provides an example of deve- loping a set of KRI for internal information system.
In real situations, the work of project-oriented businesses takes place in conditions of high uncertainty. In particular, the moments of the receipt of project execution time, as well as costs and other factors are yutsya-random numbers with given or unknown to the laws of the distributions. Management capabilities offered by the use of stochastic process models of the current scenario management ene and port-felyami projects presented in this paper.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.