Наблюдаемая и ненаблюдаемая ликвидность на российском рынке акций
The present study attempts to identify explicit and implicit liquidity in the Russian stock market and to assess its impact on a stock’s expected returns. Explicit liquidity is approximated along two projections which are trading costs and trading activity. Implicit liquidity is seen as embedded in such parameter as a company’s size. It is assumed that sensitivity of expected returns to changes in the state of liquidity is lower (has a lower slope of the regression coefficient) for large caps. The obtained results for an ex ante cross-sectional regression model evidence in favour of explanatory power of liquidity. However, the direction of its impact on a stock’s expected returns is diametrically opposite to the one suggested by theory.
We examine the impact on the quality of a securities market of hiding versus displaying orders that provide liquidity. Display expropriates informational rents from informed agents who trade as liquidity providers. The informed then exit liquidity provision in favor of demanding liquidity where they trade less aggressively. Trading costs to uninformed liquidity demanders are higher, bid-ask spreads are wider and midquotes are less informationally ecient when orders that provide liquidity are displayed. Our analysis suggests that market innovations, which might seem to favor the informed over the uninformed, can enhance market quality by intensifying competition among the informed.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.