Конкуренция между вузами и государственное регулирование
The paper focuses on the specifics of government regulation of higher education market in Russia. We propose a theoretical model of price competition between universities under vertical differentiation, where each university provides services in accordance with state-funded quota and sets the price for the services produced above this quota. It is shown that efficient allocation of state-funded quota between universities brings equalization of the tuition fees under identical marginal cost but it does not result in socially efficient allocation of resources. The analysis of price regulation that sets minimum tuition at the level of state-funded financing level revealed that this regulation is beneficial for the universities that had their tuition fees higher than, at the level of, or slightly below the level stated by the government. Universities with tuition fees far below this level are definitely worse off after introduction of this price floor. It is demonstrated that this price regulation does not necessarily bring an increase in social welfare.