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Article

Inconsistent logics! Incoherent logics?

The Reasoner. 2009. Vol. 3. No. 7. P. 8-9.

H. Slater famously argued that there are no paraconsistent logics, inasmuch as paraconsistent negation is not a proper negation. Such a vivid attack has been variously replied, including an appropriate reply by J.Y. Beziau, where the author resorted to the same conceptual framework as Slater’s argument: the theory of opposition. Slater argues that, in order to overcome the view that everything follows from an inconsistent set of premises, some paraconsistentists unjustifiably neglect a crucial property of logical negation: to ban contradictions. The point is to shed new light upon the concepts Slater used in his argument to depict paraconsistency.