Article
Erscheinung in der Schwebe zwischen Sein und Schein: von Herbart zu Husserl
The paper deals with the dynamics of appearance, which is in a constant oscillation between being
and seeming. This is an apodictical formal law of the life of consciousness: «so much seeming, so much
being». In order to clarify this, we thematize a methodological proposal made by Johann Friedrich
Herbart, which would be systematically applied by Edmund Husserl. The proposal consists in «leav-
ing any object to oscillate between being and non-being». By developing this proposal, we examine
phenomenological work as a praxis aiming at the «enrichment of sense» and a «self-transformation of
subjectivity». We conclude the essay by providing some remarks on how phenomenology could fruit-
fully appropriate Herbart’s philosophical insights.
The paper presents the ‘wave’ concept of consciousness, which is based on Husserl's concept of consciousness (Zeitbewuβtsein) as a ‘temporal flow’. Thus, to solve the problem ‘mind – body’ we offer a conceptual distinction between ‘wave vs. thing’, in which we understand the consciousness as ‘wave’ superstructure above brain. The conceptual basis for this is Plato’ distinction ‘body vs. soul’, which we complement categorical apparatus of the “new ontology” (N.Hartmann).
Proceedings of the Internationale Herbart-Gesellschaft
Cet ouvrage vise à déterminer la manière de travailler qui est propre à la philosophie phénoménologique et à la montrer à l’œuvre. Il s’agit pour cela de définir le changement phénoménologique d’attitude comme « dé-limitation » de la vie de la conscience et la méthode phénoménologique comme « enrichissement mobile de sens », pour apercevoir que la dé-limitation, à travers l’enrichissement de sens, conduit à l’institution d’un nouveau mode de recherche. Mais de quelles limitations le changement d’attitude libère-t-il ? Qu’apporte l’enrichissement de sens qui soit proprement nouveau ? Dans quelle mesure cette « nouveauté » serait-elle instituée dans le cadre de la phénoménologie ?
This book examines phenomenology as working philosophy (Arbeitsphilosophie), that is, as an open research project. The main aim of the study consists in determining the mode of performance (Vollzugsweise) of the phenomenological work in progress. To achieve this goal we provide an analysis of the doctrine of attitude (Part I.), the doctrine of method (Part II.), and then the “flexible” architectonics (Part III.) of phenomenology. These elaborations enable us to thematize the de-limitation of consciousness (Entschränkung), the enrichment of sense (Sinnbereicherung) and the institution of the new as the characteristic features of the phenomenological method of operating. This research project requires a constant oscillation between an open systematization of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy and particular phenomenological analyses.
The article examines Husserl project of the renovation of European cultural mankind in context of the genesis of Husserl’s practical philosophy, existential motivations for the emergence of the idea of renovation (Erneuerung) and in perspective of its adaptations to the contemporary. The key point of the article – Husserl’s thesis about internationalization through the phenomenological "spirit of autonomy". Аnalyzing of the problem of harmonization between universal theoretical and concrete practical dimension of the idea of renovation, author explicate the socio-critical and cultural creative potential of Husserl's phenomenology.
The book review evaluates the collective work of 12 scholars which retrace and blueprint new trends in the current phenomenology, especially оn the junction between German-Austrian and Russian-Slavic cultural and intellectual areas.
Harmony and Counterpoint in J. F. Herbart’s Psychology and Aesthetics
The realist J. F. Herbart (1776‐1841), an original follower of Kant and chief opponent of German Idealism, was particularly concerned with music in his life as well as in his philosophy. Der musikalische Herbart is the conceptual reconstruction of his theoretical reflection, involving metaphysics, psychology, and aesthetics: it is by his multidisciplinary, relational approach that Herbart contributes his original philosophy of music. In contrast to Kant, he defends the possibility of scientific psychology, which he establishes upon metaphysics, mathematics, and experience. Herbart investigates tone relations applying psychological laws and mechanisms: intervals, chords, melody, consonance, dissonance, and even equal temperament are analysed as psychological products and explained through the notions of the tone line (a kind of musical a priori) and “musical thinking”. At the same time, musical thinking can be seen as a principle of aesthetical legality, since Herbart’s account of tone relations forms the core of his rigorously formalistic aesthetics of music. His concept of music finally proves to be pivotal for later tone psychology. Review: Maier, M. (2008). Die Musikforschung, 2, 164–165
This work shows that being must originally be understood as implication. We begin with what Heidegger calls Hegel’s ‘new concept of being’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit: time as history is the essence of being. This concept however, is not univocal—for supersession means destroying-preserving. Hegel shows himself to be the thinker of truth as essentially ambiguous; and the Phenomenology is onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, the history of the being and unity, time and aspect, of the concept’s ambiguity. For Heidegger however, conceptual ambiguity confirms that Hegel’s history of being is stuck in a vulgar interpretation of time; and the Phenomenology can explain neither the origin of this time, nor the necessity of negation for the historical determination of being—for Hegel cannot think the ground of the concept of being, that is, the grounding of the ground. If Heidegger argues however, that the Phenomenology is predetermined by its ancient point of departure, we must go back to the Greeks, back to Aristotle’s original insight (overlooked by the entire history of philosophy as metaphysics): being and unity imply one another—for they are essentially implications. Thus the question of the meaning of being becomes the question of the meaning of implication.
Herbarts Allgemeine Metaphysik erscheint 1828-29 als Ergebnis langjähriger Reflexionen und vervollständigt Herbarts konstruktive Kritik des kantschen Werkes, die er bereits in seiner Psychologie als Wissenschaft (1824-25) vorgelegt hat. Herbarts Metaphysik findet zu seinen Lebzeiten kaum Beachtung – woran sich bis heute im deutschsprachigen Raum nichts geändert hat. Aus diesem Grund werden die theo-retischen Grundlagen von Herbarts Metaphysik auf Basis neuerer internationaler In-terpretationen erörtert. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass Herbarts methodologischer Ansatz und seine relationale Ontologie zur Begründung einer realistischen Metaphysik beitragen. Herbart ersetzt das Inhärenzverhältnis durch eine funktionale Auflösung des Gegenstandes, dadurch rückt sein Werk schließlich in die Nähe zeitgenössischer Diskussionen. Dieser Punkt wird anhand von Paolo Valores Vergleich mit Quines Ontologie gezeigt.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.