This review is an attempt to read the main ideas of Catherine Malabou’s book Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality, with a particular emphasis upon the problem of the modifiability of the transcendental and the rejection of the a priori dimension of subjectivity within scientific and philosophical thought of a materialist orientation. Malabou’s thesis of the epigenesis of pure reason evinces the dynamical dimension of the transcendental, integrating structural and evolutionary conceptions of reason. Epigenesis secures the stability of the phenomenal world and allows for the possibility of a contingent metamorphosis of reason, thereby establishing an economy of transcendental contingency. In general, Malabou’s work has many affinities with recent phenomenological thought, although it makes few explicit references to phenomenological philosophers as such.
The paper deals with the dynamics of appearance, which is in a constant oscillation between being and seeming. This is an apodictical formal law of the life of consciousness: «so much seeming, so much being». In order to clarify this, we thematize a methodological proposal made by Johann Friedrich Herbart, which would be systematically applied by Edmund Husserl. The proposal consists in «leav- ing any object to oscillate between being and non-being». By developing this proposal, we examine phenomenological work as a praxis aiming at the «enrichment of sense» and a «self-transformation of subjectivity». We conclude the essay by providing some remarks on how phenomenology could fruit- fully appropriate Herbart’s philosophical insights.
The contemporary philosophy mobilizes differrent strategies of interacting with the common sense in its two most important Forms, with the bona mens and thesensus communis. The tradition of the every day language starting from the debates between Moore and Wittgenstein sees the neccessity or to defend the common sense, or to restore it, as if it was once lost. For the poststructuralism, especially for its Deleuzian version, the passion of philosophy is not the common sense, but the paradox. That is why the task of the living philosophy consist also in the provocation of the «sound» human mind. Nevertheless, the defense (or the rehabilitation) and the provocation are not the only possible strategies. For a certain tendency in the phenomenology, which places itself in aftermath of the kantian transcendentalism (the mature Husserl, Fink, recently Richir), the essential moment of the philosophical work consists in the «suspention» of the self-understood claims of the natural objectivism, of the «power of „common sense“».
The contemporary philosophy mobilises differrent strategies of interacting with the common sense in its two most important Forms, with the bona mens and the sensus communis. The tradition of the every day language starting from the debates between Moore and Wittgenstein sees the neccessity or to defend the common sense, or to restore it, as if it was once lost. For the poststructuralism, especially for its Deleuzian version, the passion of philosophy is not the common sense, but the paradox. That is why the task of the living philosophy consist also in the provocation of the «sound» human mind. Nevertheless, the defense (or the rehabilitation) and the provocation are not the only possible strategies. For a certain tendency in the phenomenology, which places itself in aftermath of the kantian transcendentalism (the mature Husserl, Fink, recently Richir), the essential moment of the philosophical work consists in the «suspention» of the self-understood claims of the natural objectivism, of the «power of „common sense“».
The contemporary philosophy mobilizes differrent strategies of interacting with the common sense in its two most important Forms, with the bona mens and the sensus communis. The tradition of the every day language starting from the debates between Moore and Wittgenstein sees the neccessity or to defend the common sense, or to restore it, as if it was once lost. For the poststructuralism, especially for its Deleuzian version, the passion of philosophy is not the common sense, but the paradox. That is why the task of the living philosophy consist also in the provocation of the «sound» human mind. Nevertheless, the defense (or the rehabilitation) and the provocation are not the only possible strategies. For a certain tendency in the phenomenology, which places itself in aftermath of the kantian transcendentalism (the mature Husserl, Fink, recently Richir), the essential moment of the philosophical work consists in the «suspention» of the self-understood claims of the natural objectivism, of the «power of „common sense“».
What is a problem? What is problematic about any problem whatsoever, philosophical or other-wise? As the origin of assertion and apodeiction, the problematic suspends the categories of necessity and contingency, possibility and impossibility. And it is this suspension that is the essence of the problem, which is why it is so suspenseful. But then, how is the problem problematic? Only if what is suspended neither comes to presence, nor simply goes out into absence, that is, if the suspension continues, which continues the problem. But what is problematic about suspension? As a consideration of language shows, the problem of suspension is the problem of implication. If being, for example, is merely implied, neither present nor absent, then it is the suspension of both, at least insofar as it is problematic. And this not only says something about language; rather, it has ontological implications as well — it speaks of being, and the being of anything whatsoever. For if being is implied, if that is the problem of being, it is because being is an implication. Then the being of things like problems is implied as well; or being is in things by implication. But what does it mean for being to be neither presence nor absence, but an implication? It means that being is implied in a way that is problematic - before it is necessary, or even possible. For being’s way of being is characterized by suspension - which has implications for thinking and speaking about being, and about things like problems, even about anything whatso- ever. And this has implications for what being implies, namely, unity and time and aspect.
In this paper the different meanings of teleology in E. Husserl’s phenomenology are treated, notably the three thematic rubrics of the teleological: the teleology of history, the ethical teleology and the teleology of intentionality (immanent teleology of the experience). The following common features of the diverse teleological investigations are determined: concordance, completeness, inﬁnity (i.e. the inﬁnite tasks). On this ground we conclude on the fundamental role of teleology within the intentional analysis of consciousness and on its key-role in the passage towards the phenomenological attitude.
In the article is analyzed the character of presence of Political in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. In the course of reconsideration of the criticism, voiced in the works by Friedrich Fellmann, Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas, author finds the strengths and weaknesses of this criticism, as well as reveals the conceptual foundations and content of the political dimension in Husserl's phenomenology. Herewith, the focus is on the theory of intersubjectivity and theory of lifeworld, which constitute the conceptual core of Husserl's phenomenological research on social, ethical and political issues. The reconsideration of Fellmann's criticism is based on the consideration of the character of presence of the political dimension in intellectual and biographical heritage Husserl's. In the analysis of Arendt's criticism author puts forward the thesis about the existence of two theories of intersubjectivity in Husserl's phenomenology: theory of the constitution of alter ego in the “primordial world” by “analogizingtransfer” and theory based on the doctrine of “primary Me”, mutual constitution and on the analyses of passive genesis. The problematization of Habermas ' criticism is based on the rethinking of the place and importance of practical philosophy in Husserl's phenomenology, as well as on the identification of the heuristic potential of the lifeworld concept's for the construction of social and political theory. Based on the philosophy of the state, reconstructed by Karl Schuhmann on the materials of Husserl's heritage, author explicates the key prerequisites, ideas and terms, constitutive for the political dimension of Husserl's phenomenology and essential for its understanding in historic-philosophical and modern contexts. The results of the analysis contribute to a more adequate understanding of the nature of the political problematic in Huserl’s phenomenology.
Frangeskou’s point of departure in his juxtaposition of Levinas and Kant is the problem of transcendental schematism and not the tension between autonomy and heteronomy as in most of the published literature. Thus the middle ground between Levinas and Kant is occupied by Heidegger, but also by Franz Rosenzweig with his “biblical” version of ecstatic temporality. Levinassian diachrony is described by Frangeskou as a new form of ecstatic temporality, different from those of Heidegger and Rosenzweig, and as an analogue of transcendental schematism of reason. We briefly compare Frangeskou’s interpretation with Marc Richir’s notion of transcendental schematism which also goes back to Levinassian diachronic temporality. Richir’s schematism functions as a medium joining together heterogenous elements such as the layer of ‘phenomenological’, that is, unstable and flickering sense, and the layer of ‘symbolic’, that is, organised and stabilised sense. In a similar way, for Frangeskou, diachronic temporality provides a synthesis (though not synchronisation) of God, world and man.
In this paper we treat the problematic of immanent teleology of experience in the boundaries of transcendental phenomenology, including problems such as the accomplishment of intention, adequate evidence, and implications of reason in experience. We bring special attention to the thematic of the Thing, which we treat as a “regulative idea” or as a τέλος. In the paper, we also discuss the synthesis of the concordance of experience and the mental experiment of the dissolving of concordance. On this grounds we conclude with a discussion of the possible connection between immanent teleology of experience and phenomenological metaphysics.
The article raises the question of possible common philosophical experience, a more fundamental one that the usual division into schools or traditions of philosophy. I propose to seek for such an experience in a typical (for the twentieth-century philosophy) form of a philosophical wonder which I would call the “oddity of the obvious”. Using the example of the Husserl’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophies, I try to demonstrate how this experience works, showing the important discrepancy between the two philosophers: a differently placed frontier between the sense and the nonsense. The most striking feature that characterizes the types of philosophical wonder established in the analytical and phenomenological traditions is an element that escapes their view: in the first case it is the being-in-itself which is considered absurd (widersinnig); in the second case it is pre-predicative experience which is proclaimed meaningless (unsinnig). I specify what strategies Husserl and Wittgenstein use, dealing with the experience of the “oddity of the obvious”; namely, they try either to retain the incomprehensibility of the obvious or to dissolve the “mental cramp”. The philosophical tradition (phenomenological or analytical one) takes one of the possible forms of the philosophical wonder to be the basic form. For the phenomenological philosophy, quite an emblematic feature is the effort to retain the “oddity of the obvious”, and for the analytical philosophy (of wittgensteinian provenance) – the dissolution of “mental cramp”, of philosophical bewilderment, the release from vague intellectual disquiet. Concluding the article, I propose to consider the alteration of the philosophical wonder models as a possibility of overcoming intrashop discrepancies between the philosophical traditions.
This paper examines the contensive and methodological functions of the «primary (living) pres- ent» in the Husserl’s late phenomenology. In the first part of the paper transcendental being as a «concrete primarily living present» and transcendental life as a «Heraclitean streaming present» are thematized. In the second part I examine the role of an investigation into the living present in the context of a change of attitude. In the conclusion special attention is given to the primal fact of the «living present» and to the situation of «auto-discovery» in reflection.
Martin Heidegger’s philosophy had a profound influence on the late Soviet and post-Soviet philosophical landscape. Nevertheless, there is no general picture of perception and critique of Heidegger’s philosophy in Russia. This article deals with Heidegger’s entry into the Russian philosophical scene as a philosopher of the future — a conservative critic of late modernity, a thinker of Being, and a “post” philosopher. On the one hand, by virtue of the influence French post-modernism had on late Soviet and post-Soviet philosophy, Russia has developed a special interest in Heidegger’s deconstruction theory. On the other hand, the reception of critique given by Heidegger to European nihilism, totalitarianism and machine technology, as the manifestations of modernity, has prompted significantly the interest in “political ontology”. The specifics of reception of Heidegger in Russia can also be traced to a refusal to make a strict division between the pure “core” of Heidegger’s philosophy and “accidental” circumstances associated with social and political aspects of his work in 1930s. The ongoing discussion about recently published Black Notebooks manifests not just the fact that there is a separate language of description and analysis existing in Russian philosophical field but also the original tendency for holistic consideration of Heidegger’s thinking, which includes not just his existential and historical reflections but also political passages and critique of civilizational discourse. Besides the reviews of Black Notebooks made by N. V. Motroshilova, V. V. Mironov and D. Mironova in the last year’s issues of Voprosy Filosofii (a philosophical journal), the attention is focused on the earlier works by N. V. Motroshilova, V. V. Bibikhin, A. V. Gulyga, V. A. Podoroga and A. G. Dugin, related to Heidegger’s overcoming of the Western metaphysical tradition and his concept of a new beginning beyond Machenschaft. The article is also devoted to considertion given to a new book by J. Love (2017) examining the philosophical influence Heidegger exerts in Eastern Europe and Russia.
The paper offers a critical analysis of a programmatic article by Alexander Mikhailovsky devoted to the reception of the “late” Heidegger’s philosophy in Russian philosophical community. I mainly focus on Mikhailovsky’s thesis on the peculiar esoterism of Heidegger’s “being-historical” thought demanding a special philosophical practice of a “meaningful silence” considered as the only commensurate approach to it. Moreover, according to Mikhailovsky, only Russian cultural and philosophical space (by which he understands mainly the Russia’s conservative cultural and political thought) retains the ability to perform this kind of silence, while Western researchers and scholars have completely lost it.
I put forward the following main arguments against the A. Mikhailovsky’s theses: 1) at once several varieties of “esoterism” are inherent in Heidegger’s philosophy (both “early” and “late”), none of which requires a disavowal of public scientific discussion and, instead, an undertaking of a particular socio-political mission; 2) Heidegger’s conception of the so-called “other beginning” is not a radical-reformist but diagnostic one, that is to say, in its basic intentions it is not active revolutionary but rather quietist; 3) By now, the most substantial contribution to the systematic research of Heidegger’s legacy is made by Western interpreters; 4) Heidegger’s publishing policy testifies precisely to his intention to prevent ideologized forms of appropriation of his philosophy and, on the contrary, to guarantee the possibility of its systematic scientific reception.
In addition to issues of content, I pay attention to the rhetorical form of the article in question. From my point of view, Alexander Mikhailovsky’s rhetorical strategy draws on a general tonality that came to be strongly associated with reception of Heidegger in Russian speaking cultural space due to the translations of Heidegger’s works into Russian in the 1980-90s. In conclusion I present in general outline my own – alternative – view on the productive strategies of treating the Heidegger’s theoretical legacy.