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## Аксиоматика некооперативного подхода к коалиционным играм

An axiomatics of power indices in voting with quota was proposed. It relies on the additivity and dictator axioms. Established was an important property that the player’s power index is representable as the sum of contributions of the coalitions in which it is a pivot member. The coalition contributions are independent of the players’ weights or the quota. The general theorem of power index representation and the theorem of representation for a power index of anonymous players were formulated and proved.

This book is devoted to game theory and its applications to environmental problems, economics, and management. It collects contributions originating from the 12th International Conference on “Game Theory and Management” 2018 (GTM2018) held at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia, from 27 to 29 June 2018.

The collecton contains paper accepted for the Seventh International Conference Game theory and Management (June 26-28, 2013, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its application to mamagement.

The volume may be recommended for researchers and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.

Sited and reviewed in: Math-Net.Ru and RSCI. Abstracted and indexed in: Mathematical Reviews, Zentralblatt MATH and VINITI.

The problem of axiomatic and algorithmic constructions of the threshold decision making is studied in the case when individual opinions are given as m-graded strict preferences (with m ≥ 3). It is shown that the only rule satisfying the introduced axioms is the threshold rule. Two explicit algorithms are presented: the ordering algorithm, under which the vector-grades of alternatives are successively written out, and an enumerating social decision function corresponding to the natural order of the weak order equivalence classes.

This book is devoted to game theory and its applications to environmental problems, economics, and management. It collects contributions originating from the 12th International Conference on “Game Theory and Management” 2018 (GTM2018) held at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia, from 27 to 29 June 2018.

The paper proposes a list of requirements for a game able to describe individually motivated social interactions: be non-cooperative, able to construct multiple coalitions in an equilibrium and incorporate intra and inter coalition externalities. For this purpose the paper presents a family of non-cooperative games for coalition structure construction with an equilibrium existence theorem for a game in the family. Few examples illustrate the approach. One of the results is that efficiency is not equivalent to cooperation as an allocation in one coalition. Further papers will demonstrate other applications of the approach.

Expands axiomatic core of the modern theory of competition. Showing the main problems and inconsistencies of the axiomatic core.

We use so-called “Imputation Distribution Procedure” approach to sustain long-term cooperation in n-person multicriteria game in extensive form.

We offer a general approach to describing power indices that account for preferences as suggested by F. Aleskerov. We construct two axiomatizations of these indices. Our construction generalizes the Laruelle-Valenciano axioms for Banzhaf (Penrose) and Shapley-Shubik indices. We obtain new sets of axioms for these indices, in particular, sets without the anonymity axiom.

We address the external effects on public sector efficiency measures acquired using Data Envelopment Analysis. We use the health care system in Russian regions in 2011 to evaluate modern approaches to accounting for external effects. We propose a promising method of correcting DEA efficiency measures. Despite the multiple advantages DEA offers, the usage of this approach carries with it a number of methodological difficulties. Accounting for multiple factors of efficiency calls for more complex methods, among which the most promising are DMU clustering and calculating local production possibility frontiers. Using regression models for estimate correction requires further study due to possible systematic errors during estimation. A mixture of data correction and DMU clustering together with multi-stage DEA seems most promising at the moment. Analyzing several stages of transforming society’s resources into social welfare will allow for picking out the weak points in a state agency’s work.

This proceedings publication is a compilation of selected contributions from the “Third International Conference on the Dynamics of Information Systems” which took place at the University of Florida, Gainesville, February 16–18, 2011. The purpose of this conference was to bring together scientists and engineers from industry, government, and academia in order to exchange new discoveries and results in a broad range of topics relevant to the theory and practice of dynamics of information systems. Dynamics of Information Systems: Mathematical Foundation presents state-of-the art research and is intended for graduate students and researchers interested in some of the most recent discoveries in information theory and dynamical systems. Scientists in other disciplines may also benefit from the applications of new developments to their own area of study.

This article is talking about state management and cultural policy, their nature and content in term of the new tendency - development of postindustrial society. It mentioned here, that at the moment cultural policy is the base of regional political activity and that regions can get strong competitive advantage if they are able to implement cultural policy successfully. All these trends can produce elements of new economic development.