Russian Media Piracy in the Context of Censoring Practices
This paper suggests that media piracy in Russia is a cultural phenomenon caused largely by long-standing state ideological pressures. It also questions the common approach that considers the issue of piracy in economic or legal terms. In Russia, piracy historically concerns not only copyright issues but also censoring practices, and the sharing of pirated content is a socially acceptable remnant of Soviet times. This paper uses an institutional approach to show how anti-copyright state policy was used in the Soviet time to curtail the freedom of speech. Analysis of the new anti-piracy law reveals that current state policy intended to protect copyright may also be used to control content; moreover, this analysis concludes that the new policy is not likely to curb piracy.
A detailed transcript of the discussion of the performance of Yu.P. Lyubimov in the official state institution shows one of the stages of passing the theatrical performance through the Soviet censorship. The discussion is attended by: B. Pokarzhevsky, M. Miringof, and others (from the Mossovet); director of the theatre Yu. P. Lyubimov, historian of literature A. Anikst, philosopher V. Nazarov (from the theater).
In an article on Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic war, analyzes the reconstructive potential of the three documents of the Federal archives. The author is based on the principles of "the new history of propaganda": the multifunctionality of propaganda, the presence of a feedback mechanism, the complementarity of direct and indirect methods of propaganda, the differentiation of the propaganda on social and professional groups. Based on the analysis of the main complexes of archival documents, the conclusion about the specifics of Soviet war propaganda.
This paper investigates the relationship between the Russian government and mass media businesses. With the state ownership monopoly in the past, transitioning countries do not have evolutionary experience of enforcing corporate law, transparency or protecting minority shareholder rights, and balanced response to stakeholder interests. These represent formal valuable instruments of formal economy. We examine Russia’s recent developments in ownership structure in mass media industries based on insider information – semi-structured interviews with owners and/or top managers of mass media companies from Russian regions, capital cities, and also freelancers who are not affiliated with traditional media companies. With consensus to principles of democratic developments, the share of the state ownership and non-related businesses in Russia’s mass media capital decreased dramatically. Does it mean that mass media companies are becoming independent from the state and oligarchs? We argue that it is still far from being true, and informal pressures and controls over mass media have been developed and are widely used in Russia. We state that loyalty to state/municipal/regional powers (lobbying of their interests) helps these companies to compete against “independent” media. This erosion of principles of independence of mass media in Russia is the result of a corrupted governance model.
What is the theatre of the Soviet state? This is the theatre, forced to live on the State rules. Theatre, clamped in a vise of the censorship machine. Why prohibited performances? Not because that found in them something seditious... The state feared theatre. Afraid of the art of the original, unexpected, beyond, such as in the Theatre on Taganka. Reading censorship documents, one cannot understand how the theatre lived and put the new performances. Helped support of the audience.
Protocols discussions performances officials and unique Artistic Council of the theater , the letters to the head of state and senior officials, article theater, notes spectators and other documents tell about the bright fate of the Taganka. A significant part of the documents is published for the first time.
The idea of this paper appeared after the workshop on ‘Human Rights on the Internet: Legal Frames and Technological Implications’, organized by the Higher School of Economics on 7th Meeting of the Internet Governance Forum in Baku (Azerbaijan) on November 2012. This paper shows importance of the trilateral Internet Governance model in context of the example of governmental insufficiency to control the Internet.
Internet technologists contribute to the practical realization of human rights. First of all, they can improve effectiveness of existing institutions. Unfortunately in the same time Internet technologies give rise to new mechanisms of human rights violations. So we need to create new means, new technologies for human rights protection. We need new technological means, identification and classification of violations, based on predictive analytics. But to improve the situation, we should improve the existing means, and build new models of communication. Perhaps such models could be based on the concept of Web 2.0 and Web 3.0.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.