“Ignoramus et ignorabimus”? Does contemporary antiphysicalism have a positive program?
This article attempts to find out whether the contemporary antiphysicalism has a positive program. Using the approaches of such contemporary analytical philosophers as Colin McGinn, Joseph Levine, Noam Chomsky, Thomas Nagel, and David Chalmers, the author evaluates the ratio of negative and positive components in modern antiphysicalistic approaches, and determines the role of skepticism in their theories. To what extent can antiphysicalism withstand physicalism, and is physicalism in spite of its faults in a better position, since it offers, admittedly imperfect answers, while antiphysicalism does not offer anything other than criticism of the existing theories?
The paper analyses the logical structure of Kripke’s modal essentialist argument against materialism and also puts it in the broader context of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. The comparison is made between Kripke’s essentialism and that of Aristotle. It is argued that Kripke’s anti-materialist argument had influenced significantly related arguments of Thomas Nagel, Joseph Levine and especially David Chalmers. However, as for the former, Kripke's notion of «necessary a posteriori» puts some pressure on his zombie argument. Chalmers tries to deal with this problem by introducing two-dimensional semantics. Due to the strength and convincingness of Kripke’s argument physicalistic materialism nowadays has lost its status of «orthodox» stance in the analysis of consciousness.
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason aims to determine boundaries of reason. Reason is a
faculty of the soul. But Kant does not deal explicitly with the question what a faculty of the soul itself may be. The dissertation construes Kant’s implicit notion of a mental faculty in relation to psychological debates in 17th and 18th century Germany. It can be shown that Kant agreed with Christian August Crusius in that faculties are real properties, an assumption that was denied by Christian Wolff. This poses a problem which is fundamental for understanding Kant’s project: How can we have knowledge of mental faculties at all? If knowledge of faculties was empirical for Kant, it would belong to psychology rather than to epistemology which, according to Kant, must not rely on empirical facts. In order to find out whether there can be knowledge a priori about mental faculties, the book provides a close reading of relevant passages from published texts and other sources (lecture transcripts, Reflexionen). The final result is negative: Kant has no conclusive argument for the real existence of mental faculties. Nevertheless, an awareness of Kant’s unwritten “metaphysics of the mental” is essential for understanding implicit premisses of Kant’s thought.
The purpose of this essay is to examine the view that every human being is a natural skeptic when confronted with the issues of objective knowledge or moral value. This view is characteristic by so-called new skeptics in contemporary analytical philosophy, many of whom refer to Hume's naturalism as a source for their account of the nature of human knowledge. In particular, they argue that the intuitive conceivability of a skeptical hypothesis is much stronger and immune to refutation than anti-skeptical arguments based on theoretical speculation about the meanings of the words or the contexts of their application. Moreover, new skeptics insist on the irrelevance of anti-skeptical responses when viewed in the light of human condition in the world. In this essay I argue that anti-skeptics in fact have sound arguments against epistemological skepticism because they point out that the intuitive status of a skeptical hypothesis is not so much natural, but rather dependent on the social context and historical traditions of our culture. At the end of the essay I also argue that some versions of pragmatism in epistemology are not to be confused with relativism.
Author shows how and why the method of radical interpretation proposed by D. Davidson can solve the problems that are ormulated in a variety of skeptical scenarios. In particular, the method of radical interpretation renders the Cartesian skeptical scenario (both in its traditional and recent versions) obscure and even deprives it of its status of a philosophical problem as such. Appealing to the diberence between intended and unintended lies, one can see how the global skeptical scenario gets solved in both cases. This paper also extends Willard Van Orman Quine’s argument for an expanded version of a naturalized epistemology by introducing social factors to this approach. In addition, there are always at least two necessary limitations imposed by communication on our hypotheses about knowledge and delusion.
The problem of free will remains one of the primary unsolved problems of John Sealre’s philosophy. In his book ‘Freedom and Neurobilology’ (2007) Searle proposes two alternative hypothesis that would allow one to make sense of the nature of freedom, but ultimately finds both of them unsatisfactory. In this paper we propose a modified version of Searle’s argument, which attempts to reconcile the common sense intuitions with physiological determinism on the basis of Kahneman’s theory of cognitive systems. Specifically, we focus on the collision between the fast and the slow cognitive system as the basis for the experience of freedom.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.