Аукцион — достаточное условие конкуренции? Сговор на рынке государственных закупок
Antitrust legislation of many countries admits horizontal agreements between market participants as illegal per se not only in case of price fixing, market sharing, but also in case of bid-riggings. This paper has presented a review and an academic assessment of market participants behavior at auctions by bidding. Such behavior creates incentives to collude and to sustain a collusion but with some features which are suitable for auctions. These suitable features for auctions are in detail described in the paper of R. Preston Mcafee and John Mcmillan “Bidding Ring”. In order to collude, the bidders must resolve their asymmetric-information problem: they must have some way of selecting a winner and a winning bid. So the main characteristic of auction by bidding is asymmetric information. The knowledge is non-uniform distributed between the parties to the contract: the seller does not know a demand of auction by bidding participants. Otherwise the seller would know what price it is worth to set.
In our paper we used these features and the conditions of collusion’ sustainability to give academic assessment of market participants behavior at the auctions by bidding. We showed that the cartel sustainability in the conditions of e-auction corresponds to balance of profit and expected fine imposed in the case of cartel detection but not corresponds to discount factor as an indicator of “cartel sustainability”. The cases of Russian antitrust practice which are devoted to the auction by bidding in the pharmaceutical market gave us an opportunity to show how the firms use the price strategies to keep the prices at the rate which give them to earn monopoly profits.
Despite over 30 years of worldwide reforms in many directions to increase efficiency, public transport markets present a variety of arrangements regarding operations, control and ownership that are amenable to improvement. This workshop will examine the contextual economic, political, cultural and social factors behind these many different cases that can be observed around the world. Through a better understanding of such factors it will examine the competition and ownership options for regulated public transport markets, taking full account of local contextual factors. This will include examination of methods for improving performance without major competition and ownership changes, for example by improved institutional design (both top-down and bottom-up), the development of trusting partnerships, the promotion of negotiated contracts and the introduction of optimal operating rules.
There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders impose strong negative externalities upon each other. In this note, we argue that these inefficiencies can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any publicly observable payment they would like to make. These payments, so-called flexible entry fees, do not affect the allocation decision of the auctioneer. We show that auctions with flexible entry fees have a fully revealing equilibrium where bidders signal their type before the auction itself takes place.
This is the first paper on consumer search where the cost of going back to stores already searched is explicitly taken into account. We show that the optimal sequential search rule under costly second visits is very different from the traditional reservation price rule in that it is nonstationary and not independent of previously sampled prices. We explore the implications of costly second visits on market equilibrium in two celebrated search models. In the Wolinsky model some consumers search beyond the first firm and in this class of models costly second visits do make a substantive difference: equilibrium prices under costly second visits can both be higher and lower than their perfect recall analogues. In the oligopoly search model of Stahl where consumers do not search beyond the first firm, there remains a unique symmetric equilibrium that has firms use pricing strategies that are identical to the perfect recall case.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker, Shaffer and Spierdijk (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market. Non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan.
This paper examines determinants of corruption across Russian regions. Key contributions include: (i) a formal study of economic corruption determinants across Russian regions; (ii) comparisons of determinants of perceived corruption versus those of actual corruption; and (iii) studying the influence of market competition and other factors on corruption. The re-sults show that economic prosperity, population, market competition and urbanization are significant determinants of Russian corruption. The use of alternative corruption measures reveals that economic prosperity and population have a largely similar impact on corrup-tion perceptions and corruption incidence. However, there are significant differences in the effects of competition and urbanization.
This study analyzes the effects of reducing trade barriers in the context of the objectives of competition policy. Separate chapters are devoted to the assessment of the height of Russian trade barriers, the analysis of the impact of international trade on domestic prices and concentration of production.
Smoking is a problem, bringing signifi cant social and economic costs to Russiansociety. However, ratifi cation of the World health organization Framework conventionon tobacco control makes it possible to improve Russian legislation accordingto the international standards. So, I describe some measures that should be taken bythe Russian authorities in the nearest future, and I examine their effi ciency. By studyingthe international evidence I analyze the impact of the smoke-free areas, advertisementand sponsorship bans, tax increases, etc. on the prevalence of smoking, cigaretteconsumption and some other indicators. I also investigate the obstacles confrontingthe Russian authorities when they introduce new policy measures and the public attitudetowards these measures. I conclude that there is a number of easy-to-implementanti-smoking activities that need no fi nancial resources but only a political will.
One of the most important indicators of company's success is the increase of its value. The article investigates traditional methods of company's value assessment and the evidence that the application of these methods is incorrect in the new stage of economy. So it is necessary to create a new method of valuation based on the new main sources of company's success that is its intellectual capital.