Деловая коррупция и внутрифирменные инновации: эмпирический анализ
The author offers an analysis of the Russian market theses services.
The efficiency of social reforms in different countries mostly depends on the extent to which they can be accepted by people. Moreover, even if the problems are similar, the reasons may differ, which can lead to fail in applying existing laws of one state to another one. Bribery, as shows the Corruption Perception Index, calculated by Transparency International, is a typical problem for developing countries – that also matches research (Levin & Satarov, 2000; Ilzetzki, 2010) concluding that corruption has roots in socialist regimes and that in recently established political stability instable economic situation leads to growth in crime. The main problem within the scope of this project is to identify the relation between corruption perception and level of trust in the society and to distinguish the differences in factors affecting these characteristics in post-soviet countries. The research discoveres that distrust matters a lot for the problem in Russia and suggests further examining European countries in order to explain the difference in trust.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.