Фискальная теория суверенного риска: модель валютного союза
In recent years some economies of the European Monetary Union (EMU) found themselves facing fiscal stress, with fiscal policy no longer able to insure the sustainability of government debt. In presence of sovereign risks the impact of the European Central Bank’s policy on inflation and debt dynamics may change dramatically. This paper presents a simple two-country model of a monetary union, in which one country faces fiscal stress, while the other country adjusts fiscal surpluses in line with debt sustainability criteria. Studying the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy, equilibrium inflation and the default rate, we have obtained the following results. Fiscally prudent government can reduce equilibrium inflation and the default rate by setting fiscal surpluses above the level necessary to insure sustainability of its debt. However, such policy comes at a price of wealth redistributions towards residents of the country facing fiscal limits. At the same time, under fiscal stress aggressive Taylor-rule based inflation targeting may result in unstable equilibria associated with hyperinflation or liquidity traps.
The author traces the analysis evolution of the monetary shocks effects on the economy, exploring the key approaches to modeling of the monetary transmission mechanism. The article emphasizes the necessity of the monetary transmission mechanism modification in the conditions of current financial crisis: the active role reflection of the financial intermediaries, accounting of the development degrees of institutional capacity in the economy.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.