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ТУРЦИЯ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ: “ТРЕТЬЯ СИЛА”?
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Türkiye attempted to build “special” relations with the new independent
states of Central Asia, filling the power vacuum in the region. The results of these efforts were contradictory and generally disappointing for Ankara, ending not only in decline of its activity in the region, but also abandonment of its claims to leadership. Although Türkiye made significant progress in developing economic, cultural, and humanitarian ties with Central Asian states in the following decades, the region in general was not among the top priorities of its foreign policy. However, Türkiye’s activization in Central Asia in recent years gives grounds to talk about Ankara’s “return” to the region, the reasons for which are related both to the ongoing global and regional shifts and changes in Türkiye’s foreign policy and foreign policy identity. In a situation of intensifying great power competition and increasing conflict in international relations, the Central Asian states are seeking a new balance in their foreign policy. While maintaining close ties with Russia and China, the two dominant powers in the region, they are simultaneously trying to diversify their foreign policy. Perceived as a rising power by the leaders of Central Asian states, Ankara appears to them as an attractive partner capable of both strengthening the security of their states and giving a new impetus to the development of their economies. However, despite the strengthening of Türkiye’s position in Central Asia, facilitated in particular by the institutionalization of the integration processes of the Turkic states, Ankara’s attempt to become a “third force” in the region may face a number of constraints and challenges. One of them is that Central Asia is growing in importance not only for Türkiye but also for Russia and China, as well as other extra-regional powers.