Социальные нормы и динамика обучения наблюдателей

Вопросы экономики. 2024. № 4. С. 24–37.

Bukin K., Levin M. I.

The paper is about a dynamical extension of the well-known Bernheim-Cartwright-Patel model of conformism. In this model the signaling equilibrium is a result of the optimal choice of an individual when such individual maximizes her utility by choosing a donation in the amount. In doing this the individual takes into account her intrinsic utility based on the generosity type, and social attitude expressed by the two types of observers: rational and naïve. Such an attitude significantly depends on the social norms in this society and affects the esteem of the individual. Social attitude toward generosity varies within the broad range and at its endpoints leads to either neglect of the society (I do not care what people think of me) or an ideal conformism when a person chooses the same  as the rest of the public. Cartwright and Patel have shown that the presence of the inexperienced observers greatly affects equilibrium. Authors of this paper decided to explore the dynamics of the naïve observers when they are informed by the rational ones. The dynamic law in the form of the differential equation was set and the stable steady-state solutions were found.

Besides, while working on the dynamic law some clarifications of the preceding results of the original model were done.

Keywords: социальные нормы, конформизм, Разделяющие и объединяющие равновесия