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Норма, онтология, концептуальная схема: нормативное хайдеггерианство в философском и историческом рассмотрении
This article reconstructs the normative strategy of interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time
in modern analytical philosophy, and also proposes a theoretical framework for understanding this
strategy as a historical phenomenon. The article describes the development of the normative direction
in the interpretation of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Its first branch—the socio-normative, or
the neopragmatist one—is associated with such philosophers as John Haugeland and Robert Brandom.
The second one—the ethico-normative, or postneopragmatist one—branch is represented by Steven
Crowell and Sacha Golob. It is shown that the first group of normativists focused mainly on implicit
social norms and structures of conformity, while the second—focuses primarily on Kantian ethics and
Christina Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant, as well as on the inferentialist philosophy of language of
Robert Brandom. The conceptual schemes used by each of the representatives of these approaches are
reconstructed. The connections of different approaches within the framework of the normative direc-
tion with each other are shown. The concept of a relay race is proposed, which can describe normative
Heideggerianism as a historical phenomenon. It is shown that the development of normative Heideg-
gerianism can be characterized as theoretical progress in relation to the accuracy of the interpreta-
tion of Heidegger’s texts. The grounds for the comparative “progressiveness” of different normative approaches in the updates of the basic normative conceptual scheme that they involve are clarified. It
is also shown that the progress of the normative conceptual scheme in the direction of flexibility and
adaptation to Heidegger’s text is fraught with a loss of meaningfulness of the very concept of norm. It
is argued that the concept of norm, despite the loss of its empirical content, can be used to translate
Heidegger’s concepts for pragmatic reasons.