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Game-Theoretic Models of Coopetition in Cournot Oligopoly
Coopetition means that in economic interactions, both competition and cooperation are
presented in the same time. We built and investigated analytically and numerically game theoretic
models of coopetition in normal form and in the form of characteristic function. The basic model
in normal form reflects competition between firms in Cournot oligopoly and their cooperation in
mutually profitable activities such as marketing, R&D, and environmental protection. Each firm
divides its resource between competition and cooperation. In the model in normal form we study
Nash and Stackelberg settings and compare the results. In cooperative setting we consider Neumann–
Morgenstern, Petrosyan–Zaccour, and Gromova–Petrosyan versions of characteristic functions and
calculate the respective Shapley values. The payoffs in all cases are compared, and the respective
conclusions about the relative efficiency of different ways of organization for separate agents and the
whole society are made.