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Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. 2014. Vol. 104. No. 5. P. 446–451.
Ausubel L., Baranov O.
Nesterov A. S., Журнал Новой экономической ассоциации 2026
В этой статье рассматривается целевой приём в вузы в России с точки зрения науки об устройстве рынков сочетания и экономических механизмов (matching market and mechanism design), ключевого направления современной теории игр. Мы изучаем механизм целевого приёма -- набор правил, по которым устраивается трёхстороннее сочетание между абитуриентом, заказчиком и образовательной программой. Используемый в России механизм имеет ...
Added: June 16, 2026
Аустер И. А., The Journal of the New Economic Association 2025 Vol. 2025 No. 4 P. 12–35
This work presents a simulation-based comparative analysis on the harm of manipulations in two widely used school choice mechanisms – the constrained Boston and Gale-Shapley mechanisms – through the perspective of the percentage of students getting into schools and the average welfare of students. Thus, this part of the research extends the manipulability analysis presented ...
Added: April 26, 2026
Аустер И. А., The Journal of the New Economic Association 2025 Vol. 2025 No. 3 P. 12–42
Following the change in the Chicago school admission system, Pathak and Soenmez (2013) showed that the change was justified from the manipulability perspective – the Boston mechanism, indeed, remained more manipulable than the Gale-Shapley mechanism, when students were only allowed to submit constrained preference lists (the same constraint for both mechanisms). They worked under the ...
Added: April 26, 2026
Bonkoungou S., Alexander Nesterov, Social Choice and Welfare 2025
We study a series of reforms in school admissions mechanisms motivated, among
other reasons, by fairness concerns and vulnerability to manipulation. Before the reforms
as well as after, the mechanisms were vulnerable to preference manipulation and induced
blocking students: students who miss desired schools despite having higher priority or seats
thereat left empty. We demonstrate that some of these ...
Added: November 20, 2024
Nesterov A. S., Rospuskova O., Rubtsova S., Social Choice and Welfare 2024 P. 519–548
We study the school choice problem and propose a new criterion for comparing non-strategy-proof mechanisms: robustness to manipulations. Mechanism A is more robust than mechanism B if each student (given any preferences of this student and any profile of schools’ priorities) can potentially access a smaller set of schools via a profitable manipulation under mechanism A than under mechanism B. This criterion strengthens the two ...
Added: March 10, 2024
Artemii Lomakin, Kamil Minibaev, Alexander Nesterov, Economics Letters 2024 Vol. 237 Article 111647
We examine incentive compatibility of various school choice mechanisms as measured by the number of manipulating students. We find that Boston with Skips Mechanism, Secure Boston Mechanism, and Chinese Mechanism may have more manipulating students than Boston Mechanism. Similarly, Taiwan Mechanism with smaller deductions may induce more manipulating students than Taiwan Mechanism with larger deductions. ...
Added: October 6, 2023
Bonkoungou S., Alexander Nesterov, Theoretical Economics 2023 Vol. 18 No. 3 P. 965–991
Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their level of manipulability. This ranking sheds a new light on practical ...
Added: December 9, 2022
Ausubel L., Baranov O., International Journal of Game Theory 2020 Vol. 49 No. 1 P. 251–273
Core-selecting auctions were proposed as alternatives to the VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for environments with complementarities. In this paper, we consider a simple incomplete-information model that allows correlations among bidders’ values. We perform a full equilibrium analysis of three core-selecting auction formats as applied to the “local-local-global” model. We show that seller revenues and efficiency from ...
Added: September 13, 2022
Ausubel L., Baranov O., The Economic Journal 2017 Vol. 127 No. 605 P. F334–F350
The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design that has been utilised for many spectrum auctions worldwide. While the theoretical foundations of the CCA are described in a growing literature, many of the practical implementation choices are neglected. In this article, we examine some of the most critical practical decisions ...
Added: September 13, 2022
Bonkoungou S., Nesterov A. S., / Series WP BRP "Basic research program". 2021. No. 249.
Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often inevitable and the mechanism designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms and pick the best. Real-life examples include reforms in the entry-level medical labor market in the US (1998), school admissions systems in New York (2004), Chicago (2009-2010), Denver (2012), some cities in ...
Added: September 6, 2021
Bonkoungou S., Nesterov A. S., Theoretical Economics 2021 No. 16(3) P. 881–909
Dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admissions rules in recent years. As the main motivation for these reforms, the policymakers cited the strategic flaws of the rules in place: students had incentives to game the system. However, after the reforms, almost none of the new rules became strategy-proof. We explain ...
Added: September 6, 2021
Janssen M. C., Kasberger B., Theoretical Economics 2019 Vol. 14 No. 4 P. 1271–1308
The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) has frequently been used in recent spectrum auctions. It combines a dynamic clock phase and a one‐off supplementary round. The winning allocation and the corresponding prices are determined by the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves rules. These rules should encourage truthful bidding, whereas the clock phase is intended to reveal information. We inquire into ...
Added: December 7, 2020
Janssen M. C., Games and Economic Behavior 2016 Vol. 100 P. 186–207
Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have recently been used around the world to allocate mobile telecom spectrum. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for strategic bidding. This paper shows, however, that bidding truthfully does not constitute an equilibrium if bidders also have an incentive to engage in spiteful bidding to raise rivals' cost. The ...
Added: December 2, 2016
Babkin E., Satunin S. V., Expert Systems with Applications 2014 Vol. 41 No. 15 P. 6622–6633
Challenges of urbanization require new, more flexible approaches to design of public transportation systems. Demand Responsive Transport systems (DRT) that provide a share transportation services with flexible routes and focus on optimizing of economic and environmental value are becoming an important part of public transportation. In this paper we propose a new approach to design ...
Added: January 19, 2015
Babkin E., Abdulrab H., Satunin S. V., , in: Proceedings of the 5th IEEE SMC International Conference on Systems of Systems Engineering (SoSE) 22nd - 24th June 2010. Loughborough, UK.: Лафборо: Loughborough University, 2010. P. 328–334.
The paper discusses a multi-paradigm approach to the modeling of Demand Responsive Transport systems. It contains a brief overview of issues which appear during modeling of such systems, considers various multi-agent architectures and describes some algorithms which can be used for modeling. Also the paper provides some details about previous investigations on this topic, in ...
Added: May 29, 2013