Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions

M. C. Janssen

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.011

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Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions

Games and Economic Behavior. 2016. Vol. 100. P. 186–207.

Janssen M. C.

Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have recently been used around the world to allocate mobile telecom spectrum. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for strategic bidding. This paper shows, however, that bidding truthfully does not constitute an equilibrium if bidders also have an incentive to engage in spiteful bidding to raise rivals' cost. The restrictions on further bids imposed by the clock phase of a CCA give certainty to bidders that certain bids above value cannot be winning bids, assisting bidders to engage in spiteful bidding.

Language: English

DOI

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Keywords: combinatorial auctions Raising rivals' costs Spiteful biding Telecom markets

Core-Selecting Auctions with Incomplete Information

Ausubel L., Baranov O., International Journal of Game Theory 2020 Vol. 49 No. 1 P. 251–273

Core-selecting auctions were proposed as alternatives to the VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for environments with complementarities. In this paper, we consider a simple incomplete-information model that allows correlations among bidders’ values. We perform a full equilibrium analysis of three core-selecting auction formats as applied to the “local-local-global” model. We show that seller revenues and efficiency from ...

Added: September 13, 2022

Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Ausubel L., Baranov O., American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 2014 Vol. 104 No. 5 P. 446–451

Added: September 13, 2022

On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction

Janssen M. C., Kasberger B., Theoretical Economics 2019 Vol. 14 No. 4 P. 1271–1308

The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) has frequently been used in recent spectrum auctions. It combines a dynamic clock phase and a one‐off supplementary round. The winning allocation and the corresponding prices are determined by the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves rules. These rules should encourage truthful bidding, whereas the clock phase is intended to reveal information. We inquire into ...

Added: December 7, 2020

A multi-agent approach to Intelligent Transportation Systems modeling with combinatorial auctions

Babkin E., Satunin S. V., Expert Systems with Applications 2014 Vol. 41 No. 15 P. 6622–6633

Challenges of urbanization require new, more flexible approaches to design of public transportation systems. Demand Responsive Transport systems (DRT) that provide a share transportation services with flexible routes and focus on optimizing of economic and environmental value are becoming an important part of public transportation. In this paper we propose a new approach to design ...

Added: January 19, 2015

A Hybrid Multi-Layered approach to Demand Responsive Transport Systems modeling

Babkin E., Abdulrab H., Satunin S. V., , in: Proceedings of the 5th IEEE SMC International Conference on Systems of Systems Engineering (SoSE) 22nd - 24th June 2010. Loughborough, UK.: Лафборо: Loughborough University, 2010. P. 328–334.

The paper discusses a multi-paradigm approach to the modeling of Demand Responsive Transport systems. It contains a brief overview of issues which appear during modeling of such systems, considers various multi-agent architectures and describes some algorithms which can be used for modeling. Also the paper provides some details about previous investigations on this topic, in ...

Added: May 29, 2013