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Глобальные системно значимые банки: все еще угроза для финансовой стабильности?
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 followed by sweeping overhaul of international banking regulation urged financial regulators to apply a tailored supervisory regime to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). This approach was caused by exacerbation of G-SIBs’ systemic risks and their transmission during macro-level instability. The size of G-SIBs, the extent of their market power, and the heterogeneity of their operating models resulted in their dual role in systemic stress: being a source of systemic risks for the macro-level, G-SIBs are at the same time transmitters of crisis developments to the micro-level, hence increasing their own exposure to risks.
Under these circumstances, the objectives of global GDP growth required a revision of regulatory priorities by shifting them from G-SIBs’ profitability to G-SIBs’ stress resilience through application to them more stringent capital adequacy standards and liquidity requirements that ultimately contributed to G-SIBs’ insusceptibility to external shocks. At the same time, the G-SIBs’ role in exacerbation of systemic stress still remains unresolved due to the unresolved issues of the G-SIBs’ systemic importance. Given the high level of their interconnectedness in the international financial area, dysfunction of G-SIBs can provoke a domino effect of insolvency and bankruptcies in the international banking sector.
Based on 2011–2021 statistics for all G-SIBs included in the annual lists of the Financial Stability Board, we found certain decline in G-SIBs’ systemic risks which is attributable to further strengthening of their market discipline. This proves that the international regulatory policy is on its right track. We also found that the stress resilience of G-SIBs that is a product of application of Basel III capital buffers and the TLAC standard, significantly contributed to financial stability at a level sufficient not only for the integrity of G-SIBs’ performance during the COVID-19 pandemic, but also for minimization of the risk of collapse of the banking systems that prevented transformation of the COVID-19 related shocks and instability into an economy-wide crisis. Nevertheless, the post-crisis regulatory reform failed to contain systemic importance of G-SIBs that was mostly due to the lack of supervisory tools and techniques in reduction of the negative effects of the G-SIBs’ international interconnectedness.