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Действие, норма и ценность в практической аргументации
Argumentation in law and morals often, if not always, concerns human actions and conduct, for which rational agents’ reasoning aim to justify a line of behavior by promoting some value, observing relevant norms or weighing alternative ways of how to achieve a certain goal. Such argumentation is called practical and it contrasts theoretical argumentation, over agents’ opinions about situations or states of affairs. The practical argumentation provides replies on how to behave and what to do in certain circumstances, which values or norms should be taken into accout and why. Practical and theoretical argumentation differ in their structure and in their arguments’ evaluation. In theoretical argumentation, the arguments consist of descriptive premises expressing agents’ knowledge and beliefs about the facts and situations, the discussion over which constitutes the theoretical argumentative disputes. In the theoretical argumentation, arguments employ logically rigorous, plausible or probabilistic inferences. The practical argumentation is plausible and presumptive, or defeasible, for along with its premises expressing agents’ knowledge and beliefs over situations, the arguments also contain premises that describe the consequences of the actions’ performance or non-performance, as well as the goals, values, norms and desires of agents, regarding which only presumptive information is available. Conclusions of practical arguments can be revised whenever the information over the circumstances of the planned action or the earlier assessments of its consequences are updated. Legal and moral argumentation are separate species of the practical argumentation and there is a number of significant differences between them. The most significant of them is the role of practical presumptions and reasoning ideals used in the argumentation; the difference in the understanding of the agentive criterion, predominantly institutional in the legal argumentation, is of great importance