?
On Dynamic Aggregation Systems
We consider consecutive aggregation procedures for individual preferences 𝔠 ∈ ℭ_r (A) on a set of alternatives A, |A| ≥ 3: on each step, the participants are subject to intermediate collective decisions on some subsets B of the set A and transform their a priori preferences according to an adaptation function 𝒜. The sequence of intermediate decisions is determined by a lot J, i.e., an increasing (with respect to inclusion) sequence of subsets B of the set of alternatives. An explicit classification is given for the clones of local aggregation functions, each clone consisting of all aggregation functions that dynamically preserve a symmetric set 𝔇 ⊆ ℭ_r (A) with respect to a symmetric set of lots 𝒥. On the basis of this classification, it is shown that a clone ℱ of local aggregation functions that preserves the set ℜ_2(A) of rational preferences with respect to a symmetric set 𝒥 contains nondictatorial aggregation functions if and only if 𝒥 is a set of maximal lots, in which case the clone ℱ is generated by the majority function. On the basis of each local aggregation function f, lot J, and an adaptation function 𝒜, one constructs a nonlocal (in general) aggregation function f_J,A that imitates a consecutive aggregation procesure. If f dynamically preserves a set 𝔇 ⊆ ℭ_r (A) with respect to a set of lots 𝒥, then the aggregation function f_J,A preserves the set 𝔇 for each lot J ∈ 𝒥. If 𝔇 = ℜ_2(A), then the adaptation function can be chosen in such a way that in any profile c ∈ (ℜ_2(A))n, the Condorcet winner (if it exists) would coincide with the maximal element with respect to the preferences f_J,A (c) for each maximal lot J and f that dynamically preserves the set of rational preferences with respect to the set of maximal lots.