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Differential Game of Oil Market with Moving Informational Horizon and Non–Transferable Utility
Ch. 78. P. 1–4.
Petrosian O., Nastych M., Volf D.
Non-transferable utility game of oil market is considered. Special approach for defining solution is used. This approach enables to construct a real time models of conflicting processes. Connection between the solution in the game with moving information horizon and solutions on the truncated time intervals is shown.
In book
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017.
Aleksandra L. Grinikh, , in: Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol. XVVol. 15.: St. Petersburg: Saint Petersburg State University, 2022. Ch. 7 P. 60–80.
This paper summarizes the list of our works that contain researches about optimality principles for the "n-person prisoner’s dilemma" game. The classic model is considered through the new payoff function for each player that allows to consider it without restrictions for the number of players. The new characteristic function gives an opportunity to introduce the ...
Added: October 31, 2024
V. V. Gusev, Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics (перевод журналов "Сибирский журнал индустриальной математики" и "Дискретный анализ и исследование операций") 2024 Vol. 18 No. 2 P. 271–281
The paper examines the problem of the distribution of public space. We use the methods of cooperative game theory to solve this problem. Players are districts, while the value of the characteristic function is the total number of people interested in a particular type of public space in the areas under consideration. The axioms that ...
Added: September 10, 2024
A. S. Shvedov, Mathematical notes 2023 Vol. 114 No. 4 P. 619–624
It is proved that the bargaining set for a cooperative game with trapezoidal fuzzy payoffs is nonempty ...
Added: October 18, 2023
Shvedov A. S., Математические заметки 2023 Т. 114 № 4 С. 615–622
It is proved that the bargaining set for a cooperative game with trapezoidal fuzzy payoffs is nonempty. ...
Added: October 6, 2023
Grinikh A., Petrosyan L., , in: Contributions to Game Theory and ManagementVol. XIV: Collected papers.: St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University, 2021. P. 122–126.
In the paper n-person prisoner's dilemma on the network is investigated. A cooperative game with the pairwise interaction of players is constructed. The model is a modification of the classic 2-person prisoner's dilemma problem in the game theory. Network interaction provide an ability to take into account the influence only to the adjacent players from the ...
Added: October 27, 2022
Shvedov A. S., Информатика и ее применения 2022 Т. 16 № 3 С. 2–6
Zhao (2001) suggested a new condition for non-emptiness of the core of a cooperative game. At first, a necessary and sufficient condition was found by Zhao for a particular case of games with transferable utility. In this case, as was shown by Zhao, the condition can be easily used for construction of a computational scheme, ...
Added: October 12, 2022
Shvedov A. S., Mathematical notes 2021 Vol. 110 No. 2 P. 261–266
It is well known that, for cooperative games with transferable utility (and with crisp
payoffs), the set of reasonable imputations is nonempty. It is also known for what values of ε the
set of reasonable imputations belongs to the ε-core. Then the ε-core is also nonempty. This result
is of considerable interest, because the 0-core of a cooperative ...
Added: August 5, 2021
Shvedov A. S., Математические заметки 2021 Т. 110 № 2 С. 282–288
It is well known that, for cooperative games with transferable utility (and with crisp
payoffs), the set of reasonable imputations is nonempty. It is also known for what values of ε the
set of reasonable imputations belongs to the ε-core. Then the ε-core is also nonempty. This result
is of considerable interest, because the 0-core of a cooperative ...
Added: August 5, 2021
E.B.Yanovskaya, Automation and Remote Control 2018 Vol. 79 No. 12 P. 2237–2258
A weakening of the property covariance named self-covariance is defined. Sels-covariant solutions are positively homogenous and satisfy a "restricted" translation covariance so that feasible shifts are only the solution vectors and their multipliers. A description of all non-empty, single-valued,efficient,anonytmous, weakly and self-covariant solutions inn the class of two-person games is given. As demonstrated below, among ...
Added: October 29, 2019
Avrachenkov K. E., Kondratev Aleksei Y, Mazalov V. V. et al., Computational Social Networks 2018 Vol. 5 No. 11 P. 1–28
The paper is devoted to game-theoretic methods for community detection in networks. The traditional methods for detecting community structure are based on selecting dense subgraphs inside the network. Here we propose to use the methods of cooperative game theory that highlight not only the link density but also the mechanisms of cluster formation. Specifically, we ...
Added: October 30, 2018
Petrosian O., Nastych M., Volf D., , in: Frontiers of Dynamic Games.: Birkhauser/Springer, 2018. P. 189–202.
The paper applies Looking Forward Approach to analyze the world oil market with the framework of a differential game model of quantity competition oligopoly. Namely Looking Forward Approach is used to take into account dynami- cally updating information. Under the information we understand the forecast of the oil demand dynamics. We focus on the period ...
Added: June 1, 2018
Petrosian O., Yeung D., International Game Theory Review 2017 Vol. 19 No. 4 P. 1–23
We introduce a new sequential game, where each player has a limited resource that he needs to spend on increasing the probability of winning each stage, but also on maintaining the assets that he has won in the previous stages. Thus, the players’ strategies must take into account that winning at any given stage negatively ...
Added: February 18, 2018
Petrosian O., International Game Theory Review 2016 Vol. 18 No. 2 P. 1–14
Added: November 24, 2017
Petrosian O., Громова Е. В., 2016 International Conference Stability and Oscillations of Nonlinear Control Systems (Pyatnitskiy's Conference) 2016
Added: November 24, 2017
Petrosian O., Барабанов А. Е., Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 2017 Vol. 172 No. 1 P. 328–347
In this study, a novel approach for defining and computing a solution for a differential game is presented for a case, wherein players do not have complete information about the game structure for the full time interval. At any instant in time, players have certain information about the motion equations and payoff functions for a ...
Added: November 24, 2017
Yanovskaya E. B., / NRU Higher School of Economics. Series EC "Economics". 2016. No. 127.
Two-person games and cost/surplus sharing problems are worth for studying because they are the base for their extending to the classes of such problems with variable population with the help of very powerful consistency properties. In the paper a family of cost-sharing methods for cost sharing problems with two agents [Moulin 2000] is extended to ...
Added: October 14, 2016
Elena Yanovskaya, Automation and Remote Control 2016 Vol. 77 No. 9 P. 1699– 1710
On the class of cooperative games with restricted cooperation the most popular solution -- the core -- may
be unbounded. The bounded core is the union of all bounded faces of the core. It can be empty even if
the core itself is not empty. Two axiomatizations of the bouded core atre ngiven: the first one
is ...
Added: October 13, 2016
Nastych M., Финансы и кредит 2015 Т. 43 № 667 С. 53–66
Importance The paper is devoted to analysis of the effectiveness of economic integration of firms. By efficiency I mean the standard requirements for profitability of integration (non-decreasing of total profit) in microeconomics, theory of the firm and the theory of industrial organization, or non-negativity of synergy in the theory of corporate finance and business valuation ...
Added: September 1, 2015
Yanovskaya E. B., , in: Contributions to game theory and managementIssue 3.: St. Petersburg: Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University, 2010. P. 421–430.
Interval cooperative games are models of cooperative situation where only bounds for payoffs of coalitions are known with certainty. The extension of solutions of classical cooperative games to interval setting highly depends on their monotonicity properties. However. both the prenucleolus and the tau-value are not aggregate monotonic on the class of convex TU games Hokari ...
Added: March 20, 2014
Yanovskaya E. B., International Game Theory Review 2010 Vol. 12 No. 4 P. 339–362
The most of solutions for games with non-transferable utilities (NTU) are NTU extensions of solution concepts defined for games with transferable utilities (TU). For example, there are three NTU versions of the Shapley value due to Aumann(1985), Kalai--Samet(1977), and Maschler--Owen(1992). The Shapley value is {\it standard} for two-person games. An NTU analog of standard solution ...
Added: March 20, 2014