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Green Carrot?: Redistributive Effects of Environmental Discontent in Russian Regions
This article analyzes the relationship between environmental protests and allocation of Presidential grants for ecological initiatives in 2017–24 in Russia. While existing studies generally con sider environmental conflicts on the part of eco-activism, the focus of the current article is on government strategies. This study merges the concepts of “grassroots cooptation” and regional environmental politics to explain the logic of the government’s actions toward eco-activists. This work tests the proposition that authorities seek to use not only the “stick,” forceful strategies for combating protests, but also the “carrot,” or strategies for buying the loyalty of eco-activists. In this model, the distribution of grants to support environ mental initiatives is considered a reaction to the frequency of eco-protests. Several sources of empirical data are employed here. First, there is data on the distribution of Presidential grants to eco-NGOs. Second, there is a large-scale database on eco-protests. Third, field research data from five Russian regions complements the main results. Using zero-inflated log-normal and ordered beta models with regional and year random effects, the article finds that the distribution of Presidential grants follows surges in the intensity of eco-pro tests. Fieldwork from five Russian regions helps to demonstrate that grant support for eco-initiatives is of a “gross” nature and aims to fragment the environmental movement by buying the loyalty of eco-activists, isolating them from eco-protesters, and promoting a loyalist environmental agenda. These findings con tribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms of grassroots cooptation in non-democratic regimes.