The paper is aimed at exploring the Russian state return to the highly competitive industry of retail trade by adopting restrictive industry-specific legislation in 2009. We reveal a new precedent model of governance using the liberal rhetoric of the competition protection to justify intervention in interfirm contractual relations. We use survey data collected from 843 retailers and suppliers in 2013 to demonstrate that the new legislation had not achieved the proclaimed goals. The paper concludes that instead of market facilitation, the new state activism leads to the further suppression of business and the subversion of antimonopoly policy.
This paper examines the Cold War rhetoric in US-Russia relations by looking at the 2008 Russia-Georgia war as a major breaking point. We investigate the links between media, public opinion and foreign policy. In our content analysis of the coverage in two major USnewspapers, we find that the framing of the conflict was anti-Russia, especially in the initial stages of the conflict. In addition, our survey results demonstrate that an increase in the media exposure of US respondents increased the likelihood of blaming Russia exclusively in the conflict. This case study helps us understand how media can be powerful in constructing a certain narrative of an international conflict, which can then affect public perceptions of other countries. We believe that the negative framing of Russia in the US media has had important implications for the already-tenuous relations between the US and Russia by reviving and perpetuating the Cold War mentality for the public as well as for foreign policymakers.
This paper studies the determinants of educational outcomes in the Republic of Tatarstan, Russia. Using principle component analysis, least squares with robust standard errors, and probit models, I found that family resources, including socioeconomic status, cultural and social capital, show a statistically significant effect on educational achievements and plans about educational trajectories. However, little of the variation in the dependent variables can be explained by variation in family resources. In Tatarstan, as in developed countries, family resources have a low influence on educational outcomes. Moreover, school quality, gender, nationality, peers, health, plans about future work, and other physical and psychological factors play important roles in influencing educational outcomes. Girls obtain better results than boys, and Tatar speakers show higher educational achievements than Russian speakers.
This article analyzes gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy. Continuation of unequal gendered roles in Russia's rural informal economy suggests that tradition and custom remain strong. Gender differentials in time spent tending the household garden remain signiﬁcant, as is the distribution of household tasks into gendered roles in ways that effect professional advancement for women. Land ownership is the domain of men, and women are not owners in Russia's new economy. Moreover, men earn more from entrepreneurial activity, a function of how male and female services are valued and priced in society. Responsibility that is shared includes the marketing of household food. The conclusion is that institutional change is less impactful on gender inequality than persistence of culture and tradition.
The article analyzes changes in attitudes to and interpretations of Russian "greatpowerness' (velikoderzhavnost') between the years of 2000 and 2014, that is to say during President Putin's period of rule. The concept of Russia as the great power was changing during this time in two respects: first, there was an increasing reticence of self-assessments; second, we observe prioritization of protecting the country's own, mostly regional, interests as opposed to the expansion which would be caracteristic of a great power. Moreover, this period clearly demonstrates contradictions and dangers, engendered in the process of losing self-perception as that of the great power. The readiness of Russian political elite to part bit by bit with the status of the great power and to go to the status of a regional power is combined (as the events around Ukraine have shown) with unwillingnessto sustain the new status of the country with the help of the capabilities of a soft power.Lack of these, as well as of the skills in their use, and finally, a desire to raise the rating of trust in the government with the help of "a small victorious war" have formed the basis for the aggressive upsurge towards Ukraine. In the absence of serious hard and soft capabilities, the splashes of aggressiveness in Russian foreign policy and of anti-Western sentiments in domestic political life are unlikely to have any lasting effects. They are able, however, to generate extremely negative long-term consequences for the country.
This article is based on the ﬁndings of the Political Ideas of Russian Society project realized by the Laboratory for Political Studies since 2008. The Laboratory has already conducted about 1000 in-depth interviews with respondents of various age cohorts and various social–economic statuses. All respondents demonstrated the Great Power pathos formed by two basic components d Russia is a great power and/or nostalgia of the lost Soviet might d serves the leitmotiv of authoritarian sentiments.
From the moment when wide spread of large scale assessments in sociology and economics began, the most commonly used indicators of peoples’ qualifications are the number of years spent in education and the possession of a high school/college/university diploma. But what if these formal indicators are unreliable under certain conditions and do not reflect actual literacy and competency of people? This article, drawing on data from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), questions accuracy of the basic educational indicators in Russia. There is a linear relationship between the possession of a formal graduation diploma and the measurement of PIAAC literacy of the able-bodied population in OECD countries, including the Eastern European ones. However, the analysis shows that in Russia there is an inconsistency between literacy and formal educational status. This fact in itself casts doubt on the effectiveness of formal education indicators in Russia. The social implications resulting from this inconsistency become apparent through an international comparison of research results. These ill effects have been documented in the areas of employment, education and social reproduction and in the social self-awareness of the Russian people.
The paper examines the economic linkages between the post-Soviet states from the point of view of the financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009. It aims to find out whether the interdependence between the countries of the former Soviet Union is still large enough that crises in individual countries affect the economic development in the neighboring states, and assesses the impact of the crisis itself on the linkages between the former Soviet republics. The evidence is mixed: while some channels of interdependence deteriorated over the last decade, others became more important, and some were even strengthened by the crisis itself.
The article analyzes the role of ressentiment in the long-term historical process of Russia’s collective self-identification vis-à-vis “the West”. It argues that ressentiment was persistently generated by the structure of this relationships as long as Russia’s aspiration for an equal status continually proved to be unrealistic. This induced to different discursive strategies that are described in terms of social identity theory as social mobility, social creativity and social competition. As a motivating factor for the development of these strategies, on the one hand, and a recurrent consequence of their invalidity on the other, ressentiment became a considerable driving force of discourse about Russian identity.
Russian Federation - in the Russian youth’s mind. The participants of the poll were 100 students from the leading Moscow universities. They were born after the Soviet Union collapse, so the majority of them has a very obscure idea of the Soviet reality.
The results of the research show that the image of the Soviet Union mostly drastically differs from that of Russia in young people’s mind. It is positive in the first case and negative in the second one.
This paper aims to explain the characteristics and internal mechanisms of protest activity and solidarity among Russia’s industrial workers over the past two decades. Both academic discussions and officials’ attitudes toward protests prove contradictory. Even in periods of increase, labor activism has remained limited. Yet authorities continue to show concern about real and potential discontent, while academics puzzle over the dominance of quiescence as well as the reasons for sporadic activism. The research presented in this article advances our understanding of both: the limits of protest, and the causes, forms and goals of Russian labor’s periodic collective activism. We rely on a combination of available statistical and recent survey data to try to resolve the paradoxes of labor’s quiescence and conflict, as well as elites’ neglect and concern. The research finds changes in patterns of labor activism over the two decades. During the 1990s, most strikes were limited, defensive, managed, or desperate in character. In Russia’s recovered economy, from 2006 a qualitatively different, “classical” pattern of strikes and labor relations emerged. Workers’ collective actions mainly affected large, profitable industrial and transnational enterprises and took the form of “normalized” bargaining and conflict between labor and management. With the 2008–09 recession workers returned to the defensive strategies of the 1990s, protesting wage cuts and factory closures. Survey research from 2010 shows workers to be almost evenly divided between groups with positive and negative attitudes toward solidarity and bargaining.
A compelling case can be made to develop a NATO's missile defence system in response to the advancement of missile technology and the danger of nuclear weapons. However, this development also undermines Russia's retaliatory capacity, and consequently heightens the offensive potential of nuclear weapons. This article explores the offence/defence posture of NATO's missile defence plans in terms of both capabilities and strategy. It is argued that NATO is incrementally increasing the strength and reach of its missile defence components, while rejecting any international treaty to regulate and limit their future expansion. This corresponds with a strategy of achieving invulnerability through counterforce and utilising NATO as an ‘insurance policy’ against Russia, to be activated when conflicts arise. We conclude that NATO has the capacity to distinguish between an offensive and defensive posture by discriminating between potential targets, but it has displayed no intention to do so.