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ИЛЛЮЗИОНИЗМ, РЕАЛИЗМ И ПРОБЛЕМА ВЕРИФИКАЦИИ ДИСПОЗИЦИИ
Illusionists have proposed an explanation for our tendency to make phenomenal judgements, attributing this disposition to introspective illusion that emerge from the functioning of the human brain. However, a crucial aspect of the illusionist approach is that such an illusion is precisely dispositional and does not necessarily lead to actual beliefs about qualia. A critique of illusionism is proposed by qualia quietism, that rejects the notion of phenomenal properties due to their unclearness. This position is further elaborated by the assertion that the affirmation of the existence of qualia is tantamount to the belief in mystical entities devoid of empirical substantiation. This rejection of the illusionist position, due to its contentlessness, ultimately leads to a rejection of the notion that introspective distortion provides insight into quasi-phenomenal properties that appear to be phenomenal. This rejection requires knowledge of what qualia are. The absence of substantiation for the aforementioned proposition engenders a scenario in which quietists find themselves at liberty, given the potentiality that illusionists' discourse does not pertain to consciousness, as the universality of illusion remains unproven, suggesting instead that realists are engaged in a theoretical fallacy. Consequently, the problem of ascertaining whether an individual possesses such a disposition is of significant concern for illusionism and necessitates the development of a specialised methodology, given that extant belief studies offer no insights into disposition. Furthermore, this issue is also pertinent to realism, given that the intuitiveness and apparent obviousness of their position frequently relies on the assumption of the prevalence of the relevant disposition.