Борьба с фальсификатами лекарственных препаратов: теоретико-игровой анализ

Журнал Новой экономической ассоциации. 2025. № 1(66). С. 159–176.

Fridman A., Вербецкая В. А.

We propose a model where foreign producer of authentic drag competes strategically with domestic producer of generic drag in presence of competitive producers of falsified authentic drag. Three approaches to combating of counterfeits are considered: quality control; mandatary labeling and internal regulation via full or partial state-ownership in the capital of domestic producer of generic drags.

It was demonstrated that all three instruments reduce the share of falsified authentic drag but stricter quality control as well as mandatory labeling may nevertheless bring an increase in the volume of falsified drugs sales.

Internal regulation via increased state ownership in domestic firm always decreases both the share and the volume of falsified drag sales and improves national welfare.

The impact of stricter quality control and introduction of mandatory labeling on national welfare is ambiguous and depends on quality preferences: these policies improve welfare in case of high quality valuation and reduce welfare otherwise.

 

Keywords: благосостояние, welfare, strategic competition, стратегическая конкуренция, falsified drugs, anti-counterfeiting policy, фальсифицированные лекарства