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Working paper

The Share of Manipulable Outcomes in Social Choice Problem

Tsvelikhovsky B. D.
We introduce and study two specific types of manipulation in social choice problem. These are the standard manipulation with the restriction that the coalitions can be formed only by the candidates with the same first alternative in their preferences. The second type also demands that after the manipulation the top alternative in the preferences of the coalitions’ participants must win the election. The probabilities that such manipulation will occur in a 3-candidate election of Borda type are computed. An algorithm for producing necessary and sufficient conditions for a profile to be manipulable under weighted scoring voting rules is presented. The author is grateful to F. Aleskerov for plenty enlightening discussions. The author acknowledges the support of the International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis (National Research University Higher School of Economics).