This paper sketches two approaches to the color exclusion problem provided by model-theoretical and game-theoretical semantics. The case study, modeling the experimentally confirmed perception of “forbidden” (e.g., reddish green and bluish yellow) colors, is presented as neuropsychological evidence for game-theoretical semantics.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to clarify Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thesis that colours possess logical structures, focusing on his ‘puzzle proposition’ that “there can be a bluish green but not a reddish green”, (2) to compare model-theoretical and game-theoretical approaches to the colour exclusion problem. What is gained, then, is a new game-theoretical framework for the logic of ‘forbidden’ (e.g., reddish green and bluish yellow) colours. My larger aim is to discuss phenomenological principles of the demarcation of the bounds of logic as formal ontology of abstract objects.
The aim of this paper is to systematize the variety of logical hylomorphism from the perspective of the dichotomy of substantial and dynamic formality. A brief historical review of the relation between different models of substantial and dynamic formality is given. The demarcation principles for the bounds of logic as formal ontology and formal deontology are discussed. Finally, a design-perspective on the normativity of logic is arguing for.
In 2006, Russia amended its competition law and added the concepts of ‘collective dominance’ and its abuse. This was seen as an attempt to address the common problem of ‘conscious parallelism’ among firms in concentrated industries. Critics feared that the enforcement of this provision would become tantamount to government regulation of prices. In this paper we examine the enforcement experience to date, looking especially closely at sanctions imposed on firms in the oil industry. Some difficulties and complications experienced in enforcement are analysed, and some alternative strategies for addressing anticompetitive behaviour in concentrated industries discussed.