The paper proposes a list of requirements for a game able to describe individually motivated social interactions: be non-cooperative, able to construct multiple coalitions in an equilibrium and incorporate intra and inter coalition externalities. For this purpose the paper presents a family of non-cooperative games for coalition structure construction with an equilibrium existence theorem for a game in the family. Few examples illustrate the approach. One of the results is that efficiency is not equivalent to cooperation as an allocation in one coalition. Further papers will demonstrate other applications of the approach.
The collecton contains paper accepted for the Seventh International Conference Game theory and Management (June 26-28, 2013, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its application to mamagement.
The volume may be recommended for researchers and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.
Sited and reviewed in: Math-Net.Ru and RSCI. Abstracted and indexed in: Mathematical Reviews, Zentralblatt MATH and VINITI.