Apparentement incentives under the d’Hondt method
Although almost half of the world's population lives under nondemocratic regimes, the questions of how policy decisions are made and how power changes hands in nondemocracies have received relatively little attention in the political economy literature. Gordon Tullock (1987) suggested that because there are no strong institutions ensuring consensus and regulating the election and succession of leaders, non-democratic regimes rapidly degenerate into personal rule, where a single dictator dominates every aspect of decision-making. In this paper, we draw on our work on dynamic coalition formation and investigate Tullock's conjecture formally. Our game-theoretic analysis leads to the opposite of Tullock's conjecture: provided that players are sufficiently forward-looking, juntas do not dynamically converge to personal rule. On the contrary, relatively large juntas may emerge and persist as ruling coalitions for a very simple and intuitive reason: the absence of strong institutions not only enables some junta members to eliminate others, but also implies that current members cannot make credible commitments and in particular cannot refrain from engaging in further rounds of elimination.
We use the payment schedule based approach to ensure stable cooperation in multistage games with vector payoffs.
Measuring indirect importance of various attributes is a very common task in marketing analysis for which researchers use correlation and regression techniques. We have listed and illustrated some common problems with widely used latent importance measures. A more theoretically sound approach - the Shapley Value decomposition - was applied to a rich data set of US internet stores. The use of store-level data instead of respondent-level data allowed us to reveal the factors, which are powerful in explaining, why some stores have higher rates of willingness to make repeat purchases than the others. By confronting the indirect importance and performance measures for three different internet stores, we have revealed strengths, weaknesses, attributes that the company should bring customers' attention to and attributes that do not require immediate improvement.
Transport industry in economy had been studied for many years, however, only recently researchers have begun to widely apply concepts of cooperative game theory to optimize costs and profits which are incurred in hauling. Today a wide range of cost/profit allocation methods have become a trend in transport segment, particularly in logistics operations. The most of these methods based on cooperative game theory consider the effect of collaboration (cooperation) which means the integration of companies as a key way to share transportation costs or profits. This study aims to contribute to this area of research by exploring different allocation methods such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus and some other excess based solution concepts of transferable utility game (TU game). In this work we overview existing studies on the subject and consider methodology of cooperative game theory. Further, we calculate numerical example of three shipping companies based on real data. In order to compare profit sharing results we compute the set of allocations and examine the constructive and blocking power of coalitions. The importance and originality of the work are that it explores the new field of application of game theory in logistics which can provide additional insights in this research area
Measuring indirect importance of various attributes is a very common task in marketing analysis for which researchers use correlation and regression techniques. We have listed and illustrated some common problems with widely used latent importance measures. A more theoretically sound approach – the Shapley Value decomposition – was applied to a rich data set of US internet stores. The use of store-level data instead of respondent-level data allowed us to reveal the factors, which are powerful in explaining, why some stores have higher rates of willingness to make repeat purchases than the others. By confronting the indirect importance and performance measures for three different internet stores, we have revealed strengths, weaknesses, attributes that the company should bring customers’ attention to and attributes improvement of which is not of a high priority.
This paper is devoted to modern approaches to the estimation of external conflict in the theory of evidence based on axioms. The conflict measure is defined on the set of beliefs obtained from several sources of information. It is shown that the conflict measure should be a monotone set function with respect to sets of beliefs. Some robust procedures for evaluation of conflict measure that are stable to small changes in evidences are introduced and discussed. The analysis of conflict among forecasts about the value of shares of Russian companies of investment banks is presented. In this analysis the conflict measure estimates inconsistency of recommendations of investment banks, while the Shapley values of this measure on the set of evidences characterize the contribution of each investment bank to the overall conflict. The relationship between conflict and precision of forecasts is also investigated.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.