Предыдущие исследования показали, что увеличение доли молодежи среди взрослого населения может привести к увеличению риска политического насилия. Тем не менее, исследования влияния "молодежных бугров" на интенсивность ненасильственных протестов практически не проводились. Мы предполагаем, что «молодежные бугры» также могут повлиять на рост числа ненасильственных протестных акций. Мы находим, что, хотя в отсутствие контролей существует статистически значимая отрицательная корреляция между долей молодых людей в общем взрослом население и интенсивностью ненасильственных протестов, эта корреляция оказывается положительной после введения контролей для ВВП на душу населения, урбанизации, автократического политического режима и распространения образования.
This article contains the analysis of the revealed contradictions between deep conservatism of the Russian Old Believers in their actually religious and sacralized daily practicians, on the one hand, and wide innovations in a row industries where Old Believers became leaders in the first half of the 19th century, with another. Declaring "novines" devil-skim "and" unacceptable, "renouncing foreign dress, tobacco, tea and potatoes, etc., Old citizens were the first in Russia to begin impost from Europe (first of all, from Great Britain and Germany) equipment, new technologies and specialists for the textile industry. This contradiction was created by the specific system of values of the company-rovers, the center of which was the spiritual concept of the Cause. The case, among other things, entrepreneurship (under certain conditions) was perceived by old rites as "the work of God for the sake of" and a personal Christian feat. Religious restrictions on the use of borrowing did not extend to such "Good Guilt." In order to carry out the "Good and suffocating cause," it was permissible to knowingly commit sin, including the use of imported equipment.
The article provides a theoretical review of institutional inertia and the conditions for its emergence through the example of Russian social policy. Although the process of inertia is natural, research debates concerning its reasons are still ongoing. The review systematizes the approaches to the notion of institutional inertia and the conditions for its occurrence. In the first part, the description and interrelation of the concepts of institutional inertia and ‘path dependence’ are presented. Then, approaches to the notion of modernization, changes in public values, the context of authoritarian modernization, and interest groups are described. In conclusion, the author offers positive and negative explanations for the emergence of institutional inertia in Russia’s social policy. The positive assumption justifies inertia with the necessity to partially resolve or postpone the solution of the problem, due to the lack of successful and elaborate solutions on certain issues. The negative explanation justifies the unwillingness of state authorities, elites and interest groups to redistribute economic resources and to improve institutions to solve problems.
The article sheds light on a still poorly studied problem of how traditional Islamic education was initially modernized in the context of buildingof the Soviet school in Turkestan in the 1920s. The focus is made on ashort history of the so-called Waqf Supreme Office that was charged with administration and management of state secular and religious schools (elementary maktabs and advanced college madrasahs) in 1923-1926.The author argues that this institution contributed to the creation of a “Soviet Islam” loyal to the communist state in Central Asia. In addition, the article investigates the role of Jadid reformists in the early Soviet cultural reforms, their relationship with the Turkestan’s Bolsheviks, and thelatter’s attitude to Islamic endowments and other cultural and charitable practices. A special attention is paid to continuities and ruptures between the late imperial and the early Soviet politics to Russia’s own Islam in its (ex-)colonial Oriental borderlands.
The monograph is focused on the issues relevant to the origination and development of the Russian defence industry complex. The adopted historical approach facilitates a profound analysis of its current state and prospects of defence industry modernization. The identified dynamics and trends of the structural changes in the defence industry complex manifest their synchronism with the changes occurring in the public management structure.
The study is intended for executive and engineering staff of the defence industry complex.
Contemporary discussion on the concept of "civilization" raises a number of questions for researchers: what is civilization? Does it make sense to talk about "civilizations" in the plural? What is the relationship between "civilization" and contemporaneity? The relevance of the issues can be confirmed by indicating the appeal to them not only by scientists, but also by politicians and common people. The cultural complexity of the contemporary world leads to the fact that the concepts are used more often, but the clarity of their meanings is largely lost. The article proposes to return to the methodological issue of definition of concepts in order to clarify how contemporaneity functions. To achieve this goal, it is proposed to consider the concept of "civilization" and "civilizations", first, in the historical context, and, secondly, to relate them to one of the most important features of contemporaneity – "late globalization". The author assumes that the undertaken consideration is able not only to clarify the use of concepts, but also to deepen our understanding of contemporaneity, as well as to get closer to the productive meaning of the discussion on "civilizational projects" which is relevant in the Russian context.
Explanation of inversions in Russian history causes major conceptual problems. The traditionally used conceptual apparatus and its theoretical schemes does not seem to really “grasp” this reality, at best, it only describes the Russian reality to some extent. It simply fails to capture the nature and mechanisms that lie in the specifics of Russian society and its dynamics. Hence, there are widespread conclusions about “pathology,” historical “rut,” constant matrix, and endless reproduction of the “predetermined” characteristics of social life in Russia. However, expanding the conceptual apparatus with a constructive approach, combined with a specific historical approach, makes it possible to single out more than one agent of modernization processes (political elite, merged with state authorities), but at least two – authority and society taken discreetly. From this point of view, the inverse nature of Russian modernization has two causes. One of these is social, associated with the peculiarities of Russian society, where underdeveloped social forces are dominated by the imperious will. The second cause is related to modernization attempts based on external historical experience. However, due to the former cause, these attempts turn out to be premature and ill-conceived, giving rise to new conflicts and deformations in society. Both causes are complementary and intertwined. At the same time, there are general civilizational processes, such as urbanization and formation of a mass society, modernization processes in Russian society, including the formation of national identity. This creates prerequisites for a qualitative change in the development of society. If the main factors of inversion “from top down” are hasty and imitative, then doing things “from bottom up” presupposes slow development of the middle class, which, nevertheless, creates conditions for real mediation.